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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
On September 13
th
 of 2012, the Federal Reserve decided to launch a new $40 billion 
per month and open-ended bond purchasing program, which is called QE3, in order to 
stimulate the US economy. On December 12
th
 of 2012, the Federal Reserve 
announced an increase in the amount of open-ended purchases from $40 billion to $85 
billion per month. Like QE1 and QE2, this unconventional monetary policy triggered 
fierce debates not only inside the US but also worldwide. One reason why people care 
so much about QE of US is that US dollar serves as both US national currency and a 
“world currency”. In spite of the rise of Euro, US dollar is the only one that could be 
regarded as a global currency, as we will explain afterwards. Researches on QE at 
least have two dimensions. One is of domestic concern, to discuss this kind of 
unconventional monetary policy under the situation when the nominal interest rate 
reaches its zero lower bound. The other is of international concern, to study the 
spillover effects of US QE on other economies, especially on developing countries.  
The main question this paper explores is how US money supply affects China’s 
business cycles. This is a question about the nature of money, specifically about the 
nature of US dollar as a global currency. There is a consensus in macroeconomics: 
money is not neutral at least in the short run. This statement should not be confined in 
the context of a closed economy. Monetary policies within one country could 
influence, at least in the short run, the economy of another country at least through 
international trade and global financial markets. The monetary policies of US, as the 
provider of a world currency called US dollar and the biggest economy of the world, 
are supposed to have strong externality on other economies. Those who are against 
US QEs hold a point that the externality of US QE is significantly negative on their 
economies. For example, QE rounds by the Federal Reserve are criticized by BRIC 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China). They share the argument that such actions 
amount to protectionism and competitive devaluation. As net exporters whose 
currencies are partially pegged to US dollar, they protest that it causes their inflation 
to rise and penalizes their industry.  
US money supply could influence the global economy in several ways. First of 
all, it has an impact on US macro economy through channels such as the aggregate 
price level within US, and the demand and interest rate of US government bonds if the 
newly created US dollar is used to buy them. Since the global economy is linked 
through international trade and international financial markets, the fluctuation of US 
economy will naturally affect other economies. Secondly, oil and many other 
important commodities in global markets are priced by US dollar. Therefore, a sudden 
increase of US money supply means dollar’s depreciation to some degree, which will 
lead to the fluctuations of commodities’ prices denominated in US dollar. Given the 
existence of exchange rate targeting for some countries, international trade and then 
the global economy will be further influenced. Third, changes in dollar’s value and 
many countries’ net exports and current accounts, caused by the change in US money 
supply, will alter these countries’ holdings of dollar assets, such as US government 
bonds, as their foreign exchange reserves. This consequently will again have impacts 
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on US domestic economy and the global economy. One should bear in mind that the 
channels above about how US money supply affects the world economy are just 
first-round effects. There exist second-round and even third-round effects, since 
different economies are interdependent and closely linked.  
Although US dollar plays such an important role in the global economy, the US 
monetary authority adjusts US monetary policies,
1
 such as US money supply, only 
according to its national economic and financial conditions prevailing in the United 
States, not in the whole world. Schulmeister (2000) discusses the double role of the 
US dollar as both national currency and world currency and the relevant conflict 
between the need for stable monetary conditions for the world economy as a whole 
and the national monetary need inside the US. He argues that the most important 
events in postwar economic development---ranging from the oil price shocks in the 
1970s to the financial crises in Latin America in the 1980s and in East Asia in the late 
1990s---could be related to US dollar’s double role. This kind of conflict generates 
some new questions for China’s economy: does an increase in US money supply will 
harm or benefit China’s economy? Does this kind of externality depend or not on the 
special institutional arrangements of China, such as exchange rate targeting and strict 
capital controls? Will this kind of externality be attenuated when China’ GDP share in 
the world becomes larger and larger? What is the scenario if US dollar were not a 
world currency?  
To answer these questions, this paper first does an empirical exercise by using a 
GVAR model in which US money supply is viewed as a domestic variable for US but 
a global variable for other economies. The GVAR result shows that when there is a 
positive shock to US money supply, China will have higher inflation rate and lower 
GDP level. This empirical GVAR model can give us some hint, but there are some 
patent shortcomings of it. For example, it is not micro-founded and then the 
transmission mechanisms are not clear. 
 Then I build a multi-country New Keynesian global DSGE model with a world 
currency. In the benchmark model, three asymmetric economies have different 
institutional arrangements and interact with each other, US dollar serves as a world 
currency and US national currency as well, and China’s economy is featured with 
Chinese characteristics such as capital controls, compulsory exchange settlement and 
sales, and exchange rate pegging. Our global DGSE model finds the following results: 
when a positive US money supply shock hits the global economy, the nominal interest 
rate of China will be lowered down (the spillover of liquidity effect); in the medium 
term both China’s real output and its inflation rate are below the steady state levels; 
and both the terms of trade and nominal net export for China will be push up on 
impact, but be below their steady state levels in the medium term. Several kinds of 
sensitivity analysis are implemented, and the above results are quite robust. Cost-push 
effect and relative price effect are employed to discuss the transmission mechanism. 
                                                           
1 For the spillover effects of other US monetary policy shocks such as nominal interest rate shock on other 
economies there are at least three strands of literature. One is to use small open economy DSGE models, such as 
Uribe and Yue (2006) and Chang et al. (2013); the second is to use GVAR models, such as Pesaran, Schuermann 
and Smith (2009a); and the last is to use other econometric tools, for example, structural VAR, such as Mackowiak 
(2007). 
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Welfare calculation for the benchmark model shows that a positive 10% US money 
supply shock will result in a positive 1.25% welfare gain (as a fraction of the steady 
state consumption) for Chinese households, a positive 0.06% welfare gain for US, but 
a 0.21% welfare loss for the rest of the world. 
I also examine the relationship between the persistence of US money supply 
shock and its influence on China’s economy. The more persistent US money supply 
shock is, the larger the responses of China’s aggregate variables would be. It is also 
found that: the response of China’s economy to US money supply shock will not 
become smaller when the share of China’s GDP in the global economy becomes 
larger (even when it is double of US’ GDP), as long as the US dollar remains as the 
world currency and there is no reform to China’s institutional arrangements.  
Counterfactual analyses are implemented in two ways: to reform China’s 
institutional arrangements or to weaken the global roles of US dollar. For China’s 
liberalization reform, three cases are considered: a partial lifting of capital controls 
with maintenance of the exchange rate peg, allowing the exchange rate of Renminbi 
to float while keeping the capital account closed, and the full liberalizing reform. For 
weakening the US dollar’s global roles, we assume the dollar pricing in the 
international trade is replaced by producer currency pricing (PCP), or assume there is 
another international bond to replace US bond as the global reserve asset. Given that 
US dollar’s hegemony is not weakened, the regime with liberalized capital accounts 
and exchange rate pegging US dollar for China is best for the Chinese households 
under US money supply shock. However, when US dollar is no longer the global 
reserve currency but instead a supranational reserve currency replaces it, then for 
China this regime is the worst kind of reform, no matter whether or not the dollar 
standard in international trade is maintained. For China, to maintain the status quo 
(nominal exchange rate targeting and capital controls) cannot always achieve the first 
best, but can guarantee a second best under US money supply shock. When US dollar 
serves only as the domestic currency for US, then for China a floating exchange rate 
regime or pegging the supranational currency can make China’s economy nearly 
unaffected by US money supply shock, no matter whether or not its capital account is 
opened.  
The recent global financial and economic crisis has generated a renewed interest 
in the implications of capital controls and exchange rate pegs, especially for emerging 
countries. Since it is not clear that financial integration can reduce macroeconomic 
fluctuation or not, under a certain condition capital controls or fixed exchange rate 
regime may be preferred by policy makers. Farhi and Werning (2012) argue that 
capital controls can alleviate the influence of excess international capital movements 
resulted from risk premium shocks. Our paper could provide some insight for Chinese 
policy makers for their consideration of capital control policies as well as exchange 
rate reforms, particularly when the effects of US money supply shock should not be 
ignored. 
The rest of this paper is arranged as follows: Section 2 provides some stylized 
facts, based on which some assumptions will be made for the benchmark model of 
this paper; Section 3 shows some results from an empirical GVAR model and explains 
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the shortcomings of this method; in Section 4 we build the benchmark model; Section 
5 and 6 is the calibration and impulse response analysis of the benchmark model; in 
Section 7 and 8 we implement some counterfactual analyses and do the welfare 
comparison; finally we conclude. 
 
2. SOME STYLIZED FACTS 
 
Before our quantitative and theoretical analyses of US dollar as a global currency in 
global frameworks, we need to clarify some stylized facts, which will justify some 
assumptions of the following econometric and theoretical models in this paper and 
can give some hints about our final results as well.  
Krugman (1984) lists and explains the six roles of US dollar as an international 
currency in detail: medium of exchange, unit of account and store of value for both 
private sector and central banks. Goldberg (2010) suggests that in spite of the 
emergence of the Euro, changes in the dollar’s value, and the fact that the financial 
market crisis has posed a significant challenge to the dollar’s long-standing position in 
world markets, the US dollar has retained its standing in key roles, according to an 
empirical study of the dollar across critical areas of international trade and finance. 
Galati and Wooldridge (2006) tell a similar story.  
 
A. US dollar is the central invoicing currency for international trade. 
The New Open Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM) literature after Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (1995) usually assumes that the prices of traded goods are rigid in the 
currency of producers: firms set export prices in domestic currency, letting the foreign 
price of their product vary with the exchange rate. This hypothesis is called producer 
currency pricing (PCP), under which exchange rate pass-through on import prices is 
complete. However, the PCP assumption is questioned by another strand of the 
literature, such as Betts and Devereux (2000), taking a different view that firms preset 
prices in domestic currency for the domestic market and in foreign currency for the 
market of export destination. This hypothesis is called local currency pricing (LCP), 
under which exchange rate pass-through is zero for a firm not re-optimizing its price.  
But in reality the dollar pricing is widely used. Goldberg and Tille (2008) show 
that: the dollar is overwhelmingly used for invoicing both export and import prices for 
the US economy and other economies. Table 1 presents some data regarding US 
dollar invoicing in overall trade flows for selected countries. Another empirical 
finding of international trade is that exports of primary commodities, including oil, are 
substantially priced in US dollar. Devereux et al. (2010) point out: among 81 raw 
material price series published by the UNCTAD, only 5 are not dollar denominated; in 
the construction of the Rogers International Commodities Index, only 5 out of 35 
commodity contracts comprising the index are not denominated in US dollar, and the 
weighting of non-dollar denominated commodity in the index is only 2.02%. 
Devereux et al. (2010) build a model and show that a dollar standard in international 
trade is the equilibrium of firms’ choices, given some reasonable assumptions. 
Goldberg and Tille (2009) use a simple center-periphery model to show that US 
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dollar’s global role as the dominant international trade invoicing currency magnifies 
the exposure of periphery countries to the US monetary policy shock, even when their 
trade flows with US are limited. 
 
Table 1. US dollar use in invoicing imports and exports for selected countries (in percent)  
Country Observation year US dollar share in 
export invoicing 
US dollar share in 
import invoicing 
US 2003 99.8% 92.8% 
Japan 2001 52.4% 70.7% 
Korea 2001 84.9% 82.2% 
Australia 2007 74.3% 52.0% 
UK 2002 26.0% 37.0% 
Source: Devereux et al. (2010). 
 
B. US dollar plays a prominent role in the portfolios of foreign exchange reserve 
accounts. 
Figure 1 depicts the currency composition of official foreign exchange reserves from 
1999 when the euro was created. US dollar and the euro make up above 85% of 
official foreign exchange reserves globally, while the former is always above 60% and 
more than double of the latter. Due to the euro crisis in 2009, the share of the euro 
reserves declined from 27.7% to 23.7% in 2013. Meanwhile, the share of US dollar 
reserves was quite stable.  
 
 
Figure 1. Currency composition of official foreign exchange reserves (COFER) (in percent) 
(Data source: IMF Statistics Department COFER database and International Financial Statistics2) 
 
Besides the above two stylize facts, the dollar is a leading transaction currency in 
the foreign exchange markets as well. With about 86% share of foreign exchange 
transaction volume --- more than twice the share of the euro --- US dollar continues to 
                                                           
2 The website is http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/cofer/eng/glossary.htm. The 2013 data is preliminary and only 
for the first quarter.  
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dominate these markets (Goldberg, 2010). 
Generally speaking, US dollar has still been playing a central and dominant role 
in international trade and finance as both a store of value and a medium of exchange, 
and no other currencies rival it. US dollar is the only currency that can be viewed as a 
global currency in the world economy. Therefore, in the following GVAR model, we 
will incorporate US money supply as a global factor; and in the following global 
DSGE model, US dollar plays two key roles as the global currency: the only invoicing 
currency for international trade and the only foreign exchange reserve currency.  
 
C. Foreign exchange reserves are now the major component of the total assets 
on the balance sheet of China’s central bank. 
 
 
Figure 2. Foreign reserves as a share of total assets for the People’s Bank of China 
(Data source: People’s Bank of China. The value for 2013 is based on the data up to August.) 
 
Figure 2 shows the foreign exchange reserves as a share of total assets for the 
People’s Bank of China (PBOC). Before 2003 this share was below 50%, but after 
2009, the share of foreign reserves was stably around 80%. Due to continuous large 
trade surplus, strict capital controls and compulsory exchange settlement and sales, 
the expansion of the PBOC’s balance sheet is mainly achieved by absorbing foreign 
capital inflows and accumulating foreign exchange reserves, primarily dollar reserves. 
Although the capital control for China is not as strict as before, and after 2008 China 
has abandoned the system of compulsory exchange settlement and sales, in reality the 
Chinese households are still not completely free to buy foreign assets and they also 
are not willing to do so currently because of the significant difference between home 
and foreign interest rates.  
Therefore, in our benchmark model below, we assume for China that there are 
strict capital controls and compulsory exchange settlement and sales, Chinese 
households are prohibited from holding foreign assets, and firms are required to swap 
their foreign-currency revenues (if there are any) with the central bank for domestic 
currency. Thus if there is a positive current account for China, the money supply of 
Chinese currency will be passively expanded. And given the stylized facts A and B 
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above, the PBOC is assumed to use all the absorbed US dollars to buy US government 
bonds. In other papers such as Change et al. (2013), a concept “sterilization” is 
discussed, which means that a subset of the central bank’s purchase of foreign assets 
can be financed by selling domestic bonds and then does not result in an expansion of 
domestic money supply. Bacchetta et al. (2013) study, in a semi-open economy where 
the central bank has access to international capital markets but the private sector does 
not, the optimal policy of the central bank when they can choose the levels of both 
international reserves and domestic public debt. Considering the reality of China, 
especially the huge share of foreign reserves in the PBOC’s balance sheet, we do not 
take into account the central bank’s sterilization activity in the benchmark model. 
 
D. In the post-crisis period the expansion of US monetary base is almost entirely 
achieved by the Federal Reserve’ buying of US Federal government’s debt. 
Figure 3 depicts the evolving paths of US monetary base and the US Federal debt held 
by the Federal Reserve. There was a jump for US monetary base in the third quarter 
of 2008. After that, US monetary base expanded from 1693 billion dollars to 3218 
billion (a total 1525 billion increase), while the US Federal debt held by the Federal 
Reserve increased from 476 billion to 1937 billion (a total 1461 billion increase). So 
nearly the entire expansion of US monetary base is achieved by the Federal Reserve’ 
QE operations. To reflect this kind of money creation feature of US and also to 
simplify the model, in the benchmark model we assume that a US money supply 
shock is accompanied by an equal amount of change to the Federal Reserve’ holdings 
of US government bonds.  
 
 
Figure 3. US monetary base and US Federal debt held by the Federal Reserve (billion $)  
(Data source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis) 
 
3. AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION: GVAR APPROACH 
 
There are some researches empirically examining the international impact of US 
money supply on some specific country, even though they are not global discussions. 
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Farrell (1980) examines the international impact of US money supply on the economy 
of Mexico and advises the Mexico’s policymakers to keep an eye on the course of US 
money supply. Bailey (1989) studies the effects of weekly U.S money supply releases 
on the Canada’s financial markets and finds that Canadian stock index, bond prices 
and short-term interest rate change with surprises in the announced level of U.S. M1. 
Another kind of literature focuses on the effects of US money supply 
announcements or QE on the financial markets inside and beyond the United States. 
They usually use high-frequency intraday data. Bailey (1990) examines the responses 
of equity values across Pacific Rim countries to US M1 announcement surprises and 
finds that the stock market’s response to US M1 is better explained by the country’s 
degree of financial integration than real economic integration ( through international 
trade) with the United States. Neely (2010) evaluates the effect of large-scale asset 
purchases (LSAP) on international long-term bond yields and exchange rates, and gets 
the result that the LSAP announcements substantially reduces international long-term 
bond rates and the spot value of the dollar.  
In this section we are going to empirically study the influences of US money 
supply shock on the global economy, especially on China’s economy, by employing a 
GVAR model in which US money supply is incorporated as a global factor. The 
GVAR framework is pioneered in Pesaran, Schuermann and Weiner (2004) and 
further developed in Dees, di Mauro, Pesaran, and Smith (2007) (henceforth DdPS), 
Dees, Holly, Pesaran, and Smith (2007) and Pesaran, Schuermann and Smith (2009a). 
The methodology we employ in this paper is mainly based on DdPS.  
 
3.1. Preliminary specification 
 
Following DdPS, we consider 26 developed and emerging market economies whose 
GDP is about 90% of the world output. Euro area (EA), which includes Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Spain, is treated as a 
single economy.  
The variables under consideration are real GDP (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
𝑗
), inflation rate (𝛱𝑡
𝑗
), real 
equity price (𝑒𝑞𝑡
𝑗
), real exchange rate (𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑗
), nominal short-term interest rate (𝑅𝑡
𝑗
), 
nominal long-term interest rate (𝐿𝑅𝑡
𝑗
), oil price (𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑡), and US money supply (𝑀𝑡
𝑈𝑆), 
where the subscript 𝑗 denotes country and 𝑡 denotes time.  
 
3.2. Country-specific VARX* models 
 
The country-specific VARX*(𝑝𝑗 , 𝑞𝑗) could be written as: 
𝛷𝑗  𝐿,𝑝𝑗  𝑋𝑡
𝑗 = 𝛼0
𝑗 + 𝛼1
𝑗 ∙ 𝑡 + 𝛶𝑗  𝐿,𝑞𝑗  𝑑𝑡 + 𝛬𝑗  𝐿, 𝑞𝑗  𝑋𝑡
𝑗∗ + 𝑢𝑡
𝑗  
for 𝑗 = 0, 1, …, 𝑁 = 25, where 𝑋𝑡
𝑗
 is the vector of domestic variables, 𝑋𝑡
𝑗∗
 is the 
vector of foreign variables, 𝑑𝑡  is the vector of observed global factors, L is the lag 
operator, Φ𝑗 , Υ𝑗  and Λ𝑗  are the polynomials of L with order 𝑝𝑗 , 𝑞𝑗  and 𝑞𝑗  
respectively, 𝛼0
𝑗
 and 𝛼1
𝑗
 are the coefficients for the deterministic trend, 𝑢𝑡
𝑗
 is the 
idiosyncratic country-specific shock, 𝑗 = 0 denotes US and 𝑗 = 1, 2, …, 25 denote 
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other 25 economies. We assume both 𝑝𝑗  and 𝑞𝑗  are not bigger than two. 
Country-specific vector of foreign variables 𝑋𝑡
𝑗∗
 is constructed as follows: 
𝑋𝑡
𝑗∗ =  𝑤𝑗𝑘𝑋𝑡
𝑘
𝑁
𝑘=0
 
where 𝑤𝑗𝑗 = 0  and  𝑤𝑗𝑘
𝑁
𝑘=0 = 1  for any 𝑗 . The weight 𝑤𝑗𝑘  captures the 
importance of country 𝑘 for country 𝑗’s economy, and here is calculated as a fixed 
number over time by using bilateral trade data from 2006 to 2008
3
.  
With the exception of US model, in the country-specific VARX* model for all 
other countries vector 𝑋𝑡
𝑗
 includes 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
𝑗
, 𝛱𝑡
𝑗
, 𝑒𝑞𝑡
𝑗
, 𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑗
, 𝑅𝑡
𝑗
, and 𝐿𝑅𝑡
𝑗
 when the 
relevant data are available for this country, vector 𝑋𝑡
𝑗∗
 includes 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
𝑗∗
, 𝛱𝑡
𝑗∗
, 
𝑒𝑞𝑡
𝑗∗
, 𝑅𝑡
𝑗∗
, and 𝐿𝑅𝑡
𝑗∗
, and vector 𝑑𝑡  contains 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑡  and 𝑀𝑡
𝑈𝑆 . In the case of US 
model when 𝑗 = 0 , vector 𝑋𝑡
0  includes 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
0 , 𝛱𝑡
0 , 𝑒𝑞𝑡
0 , 𝑅𝑡
0 , 𝐿𝑅𝑡
0 , 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑡  and 
𝑀𝑡
𝑈𝑆  where oil price and US money supply are viewed as endogenous variables, 𝑋𝑡
0∗ 
includes 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
0∗, 𝛱𝑡
0∗ , 𝑒𝑥𝑡
0∗
 and 𝑅𝑡
0∗
 where foreign financial variables 𝑒𝑞𝑡
0∗ and 
𝐿𝑅𝑡
0∗ are omitted due to the importance of US financial variables in the global 
economy, and there is no global variable for US, as given in Table 2 below.  
 
Table 2. VARX* model specifications 
Economy Domestic Variables Foreign Variables Global Variables 
US 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
0, 𝛱𝑡
0, 𝑒𝑞𝑡
0 , 𝑅𝑡
0 , 𝐿𝑅𝑡
0 , 
𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑡, 𝑀𝑡
𝑈𝑆  
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
0∗, 𝛱𝑡
0∗, 𝑒𝑥𝑡
0∗, 
𝑅𝑡
0∗
 
None 
Others 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
𝑗
, 𝛱𝑡
𝑗
, 𝑒𝑞𝑡
𝑗
, 𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑗
, 𝑅𝑡
𝑗
, 
𝐿𝑅𝑡
𝑗
 where available 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
𝑗∗
, 𝛱𝑡
𝑗 ∗
, 
𝑒𝑞𝑡
𝑗 ∗
, 𝑅𝑡
𝑗∗
, 𝐿𝑅𝑡
𝑗 ∗
 
𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑡, 𝑀𝑡
𝑈𝑆
 
 
We consider at most a VARX*(2, 2) specification for each country model, which 
in error correction form can be expressed as follows: 
∆𝑋𝑡
𝑗 = 𝑐0
𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗𝛽𝑗
′  𝑧𝑡−1
𝑗 − 𝛾𝑗  𝑡 − 1  + 𝛶𝑗0∆𝑑𝑡 + 𝛬𝑗0∆𝑋𝑡
𝑗∗ + 𝛶𝑗1∆𝑑𝑡−1 + Γ𝑗∆𝑣𝑡−1
𝑗 + 𝑢𝑡
𝑗  
where 𝑧𝑡
𝑗 =   𝑋𝑡
𝑗  
′
, 𝑋𝑡
𝑗∗ 
′
, (𝑑𝑡)′ ′, 𝑣𝑡
𝑗 =   𝑋𝑡
𝑗 
′
, 𝑋𝑡
𝑗∗ 
′
 ′, 𝑎𝑗  and 𝛽𝑗  are both full 
column rank matrices, and the error correction term is defined as: 
𝛽𝑗
′  𝑧𝑡
𝑗 − 𝛾𝑗 ∙ 𝑡 = 𝛽𝑗
′    𝑋𝑡
𝑗 
′
, 𝑋𝑡
𝑗∗ 
′
, (𝑑𝑡)′ ′ − 𝛾𝑗 ∙ 𝑡  
which allows for the possibility of co-integration within domestic variables and 
between domestic and foreign variables.  
 
3.3. The GVAR model 
 
After each country’s VARX* model is estimated, all the endogenous variables 𝑋𝑡
𝑗
 
(𝑗 = 0, 1, …, 𝑁 = 25) are collected in the global vector: 
𝑋𝑡 =   𝑋𝑡
0 ′ ,  𝑋𝑡
1 ′ ,… , (𝑋𝑡
𝑁)′ ′ 
Then there is a linear relationship between 𝑋𝑡  and 𝑧𝑡
𝑗
: 
                                                           
3
 A robust analysis in which the time-varying weights are used could be done, just as in DdPS. 
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𝑧𝑡
𝑗 = 𝑊𝑗𝑋𝑡  
Substitute this equation into the country-specific VARX* model, we can get: 
𝐴𝑗𝑊𝑗𝑋𝑡 = 𝛼0
𝑗 + 𝛼1
𝑗 ∙ 𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡
𝑗
 
where 𝐴𝑗 = (𝛷𝑗 ,−𝛬𝑗 ,−𝛶𝑗 ) is a polynomial of lag operator L with order less than or 
equal to two. If we define  
𝐺 =   𝐴0𝑊0 
′ ,  𝐴1𝑊1 
′ ,… , (𝐴𝑁𝑊𝑁)′ ′ 
𝛼0 =  𝛼0
0 ′ ,𝛼0
1 ′ ,… ,𝛼0
𝑁 ′ ′ 
𝛼1 =  𝛼1
0 ′ ,𝛼1
1 ′ ,… ,𝛼1
𝑁 ′ ′ 
𝑢𝑡 =  𝑢𝑡
0 ′ ,𝑢𝑡
1 ′ ,… ,𝑢𝑡
𝑁′ ′ 
then we obtain a GVAR model for the global system: 
𝐺 ∙ 𝑋𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ∙ 𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 
Given the GVAR model, the generalized impulse response functions (GIRFs), 
proposed by Koop et al. (1996) and further developed by Pesaran and Shin (1998), are 
based on the definition: 
𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹 𝑋𝑡 ;𝑢𝑙𝑡
𝑗 ,𝑛 =  𝔼 𝑋𝑡+𝑛 |𝑢𝑙𝑡
𝑗 =  𝜎𝑗𝑙
2 , 𝐼𝑡−1  − 𝔼(𝑋𝑡+𝑛|𝐼𝑡−1) 
where 𝐼𝑡−1  is the information set at time 𝑡 − 1, 𝜎𝑗𝑙
2 is the diagonal element of the 
variance-covariance matrix 𝛴𝑢  corresponding to the  𝑙
𝑡𝑕  equation for the 
𝑗𝑡𝑕  country, and 𝑛 is the horizon.  
 
3.4. Model estimation result 
 
Except for 𝑀𝑡
𝑈𝑆 , the quarterly data for all other variables are originally from DdPS 
and further updated in Pesaran, Schuermann and Smith (2009b) and Smith and Galesi 
(2010), which cover the period from 1979Q2 to 2009Q4. All the values of these 
variables are in the same logarithmic forms as in DdPS. The data for US money 
supply 𝑀𝑡
𝑈𝑆  is from the website of Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
4
, and the 
quarterly data is computed as the average of the monthly data. Here we use M0 as the 
indicator of US money supply. In fact, the monetary base of US dollar is a better 
variable to indicate the expansion of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet; nevertheless, 
it is not a money supply indicator. And M1 is normally broader than the monetary 
base. The correlation between M0 and the monetary base of US dollar (in logarithm) 
is 0.99, and in the period before 2008Q4 the ratio of M0 to the monetary base is very 
stable around 80%. 
All the tests (including the weak exogeneity test) and estimations are 
implemented by the GVAR Toolbox 1.0, provided by Smith and Galesi (2010).
5
 We 
focus on the GIRFs, for China’s aggregate variables, of a positive one standard error 
shock to US money supply, which are shown in Figure 4. A positive one standard 
error shock to US money supply is equivalent to an increase of about 0.4% per 
quarter. 
 
                                                           
4 The website address is http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/categories/24. 
5 Tests including unit root test and weak exogeneity test, and estimation results of country-specific VARX* 
models are not shown here, but available upon request. Particularly, the weak exogeneity assumption can be 
considered to hold for the whole VARX* system. 
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Figure 4. GIRFs of a positive one S.E. shock to US money supply 
 
Overall, the real output o China has a significant decline, while its inflation rate 
is positively affected. We can provide an intuitive explanation as follows: when US 
money supply increases, US dollar is likely to depreciate, and then oil and many other 
commodities which are priced in US dollar are going to have higher prices. Since the 
exchange rate of RMB to US dollar is quite stable, the import prices of oil and other 
commodities for China will go up. Consequently, cost-push inflation is generated, and 
real output will decrease as well, according to the textbook AS-AD analysis.  
 
3.5. The shortcomings of the empirical GVAR model 
 
Although the above empirical GVAR model can give us some clue about how US 
money supply would affect China’s economy, there are some patent shortcomings of 
this framework. First of all, as Dees et al. (2010) point out, it has proved difficult to 
use such reduced multi-country VARs to examine the effects of structural shocks with 
clear economic interpretation. Since the econometric model is not micro-founded, the 
transmission mechanism is not clear and not rationalized. The way the GAVR 
framework deals with the global linkages is also skeptical. Specifically, using trading 
weights to weight foreign financial variables such as interest rate is problematic, 
because international finance behaves in a quite different manner from that for 
international trade. Second, during the past decades the structure of global economy 
has changed dramatically, and a reduced form model with time-invariant coefficients 
can hardly capture this and is likely to tell biased stories.  
Dees et al. (2010) try to incorporate the New Keynesian DSGE model into the 
GAVR framework. They criticize the existing multi-country DSGE literature that the 
open economy contributions have tended to use either models for two economies of 
comparable size, such as the Euro area and the US (as in de Walque et al., 2005, for 
example), or small open economy models where the rest of the world is treated as 
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exogenous and there is no much interactions between them (as in Lubik and 
Schorfheide, 2007). So they build and estimate a relatively large multi-country New 
Keynesian DSGE-GVAR model, comprising 33 countries on quarterly data over the 
period 1979Q1-2006Q4. The country-specific models include a Phillips curve, an IS 
curve, a Taylor rule and a reduced-form real effective exchange rate equation. The 
main problem of the multi-country DSGE-GVAR model in Dees et al. (2010) is that 
the country-specific DSGE models are given arbitrarily, not strictly derived from the 
households’ and firms’ dynamic optimizations in a multi-country setting. For example, 
in the Phillips curve for an open economy, inflation rate depends not only on real 
marginal cost gap, but may also depend on some other variables such as terms of trade 
gap. They add real effective exchange rate and foreign output gap, which is also 
calculated as trade weighted average as in the traditional empirical GVAR models, 
into the IS curve. This is not strictly derived either. More importantly, with regard to 
our purpose in this paper, US dollar as a global currency cannot be straightforwardly 
incorporated into a simple four-equation country-specific DSGE model.  
Therefore, in the following section we will develop a multi-country New 
Keynesian DSGE model in which we sufficiently take into account the interactions of 
different economies and US dollar is modeled as a global currency as well. Moreover, 
different institutional arrangements for different economies will also be considered.  
 
4. BENCHMARK MODEL 
 
Three economies are under consideration: China, US and ROW (rest of the world), 
among which China is viewed as the home country. US dollar serves as a global 
currency with two roles: there is dollar standard in international trade and US dollar is 
the only currency for foreign exchange reserve. The linkages through international 
trade and international finance will be endogenized. First of all, Table 3 below lists 
the institutional arrangements for each economy in our benchmark model. 
 
Table 3. Institutional arrangements of the benchmark model 
Economy Exchange rate regime Capital control Exchange settlement and sales 
China Pegging dollar Yes Compulsory 
US Global currency No Not compulsory 
ROW Floating No Not compulsory 
 
4.1. China’s economy 
 
4.1.1. Households 
 
There is a continuum of infinitely-living households, and its measure is unity. A 
representative household seeks to maximize his life time utility: 
𝑈0 = 𝔼0  𝛽
𝑡∞
𝑡=0  𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑡 − 𝜙1 ∙
(𝐿𝑡 )
1+𝜂
1+𝜂
+ 𝜙2 ∙ 𝑙𝑛(𝑀𝑡 𝑃𝑡 )          (1) 
where 𝔼 is the expectation operator, 𝛽 is the utility discount factor, 𝜙1  and 𝜙2 
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are the utility weights for labor supply 𝐿𝑡  and real money balance 𝑀𝑡 𝑃𝑡 , 𝑃𝑡  is the 
aggregate price level of final goods, and real consumption is 𝐶𝑡 . For tractability, we 
assume additively separable utility here. And money is the Chinese currency: 
Renminbi. 
The representative household can invest in two assets: real capital 𝐾𝑡  which is 
used as a production factor with real rental rate 𝑟𝑡  and domestic government bond 
𝐵𝑡  with nominal interest rate 𝑅𝑡 . Since there are capital controls, Chinese households 
are not allowed to hold foreign assets such as the US government bonds in the 
benchmark model. Due to the monopolistic power of the intermediate-goods firms of 
the economy, nominal profit 𝐷𝑡 is generated and then distributed to households. The 
government collects nominal lump-sum tax 𝑇𝑡  from households. Therefore, the 
budget constraint for the representative household is:  
𝑃𝑡 ∙ 𝐶𝑡 + 𝑃𝑡 ∙ 𝐾𝑡+1 + 𝐵𝑡+1 + 𝑇𝑡 + 𝑀𝑡  
       ≤  1 − 𝛿 + 𝑟𝑡  ∙ 𝑃𝑡 ∙ 𝐾𝑡 + 𝑊𝑡 ∙ 𝐿𝑡 + (1 + 𝑅𝑡−1) ∙ 𝐵𝑡 + 𝐷𝑡 + 𝑀𝑡−1        (2) 
where 𝛿 is the capital depreciation rate, and 𝑊𝑡  is the nominal wage rate. 
Then the household’s problem is to choose the consumption level 𝐶𝑡 , labor 
supply 𝐿𝑡 , capital stock for the next period 𝐾𝑡+1, the quantity of government bond 
for the next period 𝐵𝑡+1, and the money demand 𝑀𝑡 , in order to maximize his life 
time utility, equation (1), subject to the budget constraint of each period, equation (2), 
given the price level of final goods, the nominal wage rate, real capital rental rate and 
nominal bond interest rate. The first order conditions (FOCs) of the utility 
maximization problem can yield the following results: 
𝜙1 ∙ 𝐶𝑡 ∙ (𝐿𝑡)
𝜂 =
𝑊𝑡
𝑃𝑡
                     (3) 
𝔼𝑡  𝛽 ∙
𝐶𝑡
𝐶𝑡+1
∙ (1 − 𝛿 + 𝑟𝑡+1) = 1               (4) 
𝔼𝑡  𝛽 ∙
𝐶𝑡
𝐶𝑡+1
∙
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡+1
∙ (1 + 𝑅𝑡) = 1            (5) 
𝑀𝑡
𝑃𝑡
=
𝜙2 ∙  1 + 𝑅𝑡 
𝑅𝑡
∙ 𝐶𝑡              (6) 
 
4.1.2. Final good producers and price indices 
 
Final good producers first produce home good 𝑌𝐻 ,𝑡  by combining a continuum of 
home-made intermediate goods 𝑌𝐻,𝑡(𝑖) , and foreign good 𝑌𝐹 ,𝑡  by combining a 
continuum of imported foreign intermediate goods 𝑌𝑗 ,𝑡(𝑖) (𝑗 = 𝑈𝑆 or 𝑅𝑂𝑊 ); and 
then combine home good and foreign good to produce the final good 𝑌𝑡 , which can be 
used for households’ consumption, capital investment and government’s expenditure.  
The final good producers are perfectly competitive and there is zero profit for 
these firms. The technologies of producing home and foreign good, and then final 
good are all CES technologies as follows: 
𝑌𝐻 ,𝑡 =   𝑌𝐻 ,𝑡(𝑖)
𝜀−1
𝜀 𝑑𝑖
1
0
 
𝜀
𝜀−1
                     (7) 
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𝑌𝐹 ,𝑡 =   1 − 𝜌2 
1
𝜉 ∙ 𝑌𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑡
𝜉−1
𝜉 + 𝜌2
1
𝜉 ∙ 𝑌𝑈𝑆 ,𝑡
𝜉−1
𝜉  
𝜉
𝜉−1
       (8) 
 𝑌𝑈𝑆 ,𝑡 =   𝑌𝑈𝑆 ,𝑡(𝑖)
𝜀−1
𝜀 𝑑𝑖
1
0
 
𝜀
𝜀−1
              (9) 
𝑌𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑡 =   𝑌𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑡(𝑖)
𝜀−1
𝜀 𝑑𝑖
1
0
 
𝜀
𝜀−1
                  (10) 
𝑌𝑡 =   1 − 𝜌1 
1
𝜔 ∙ 𝑌𝐻 ,𝑡
𝜔−1
𝜔 + 𝜌1
1
𝜔 ∙ 𝑌𝐹 ,𝑡
𝜔−1
𝜔  
𝜔
𝜔−1
             (11) 
where 𝑖  represents the brand of intermediate goods, 𝑗(= 𝑈𝑆 or 𝑅𝑂𝑊)  is the 
country index, 𝑌𝑗 ,𝑡  is the foreign goods bundle from country 𝑗 , 𝜀  denotes the 
elasticity of substitution between the differentiated intermediate goods within one 
single country, 𝜉  measures the substitutability between goods produced in two 
foreign countries, 𝜔 represents the elasticity of substitution between domestic and 
foreign goods, 𝜌1 refers to the share of domestic aggregate demand allocated to 
foreign goods and is thus a natural index of openness of the Chinese economy, and 𝜌2 
indicates the import share from US.  
 
Table 4. Price system of the benchmark model 
Economy Domestically sold goods Export goods 
Intermediate 
goods 
bundle Invoicing 
currency 
Intermediate 
goods 
bundle Invoicing 
currency 
China 𝑃𝐻,𝑡(𝑖) 𝑃𝐻,𝑡 Renminbi 𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝐸 (𝑖) 𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝐸  Dollar 
US 𝑃𝑈𝑆 ,𝑡
$ (𝑖) 𝑃𝑈𝑆 ,𝑡
$  Dollar 𝑃𝑈𝑆 ,𝑡
𝐸 (𝑖) 𝑃𝑈𝑆 ,𝑡
𝐸  Dollar 
ROW 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑡
𝑅𝑜 (𝑖) 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑡
𝑅𝑜  Ro 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑡
𝐸 (𝑖) 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑡
𝐸  Dollar 
 
 
Then given the price levels of goods (described in Table 4), the cost 
minimization problem of the representative final good producer yields the following 
demand functions: 
𝑌𝐻 ,𝑡(𝑖) =  
𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡 (𝑖)
𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
 
−𝜀
∙ 𝑌𝐻 ,𝑡                   (12) 
𝑌𝑈𝑆 ,𝑡(𝑖) =  
𝑃𝑈𝑆 ,𝑡
𝐸 (𝑖)
𝑃𝑈𝑆 ,𝑡
𝐸  
−𝜀
∙ 𝑌𝑈𝑆 ,𝑡                 (13) 
𝑌𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑡(𝑖) =  
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑡
𝐸 (𝑖)
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑡
𝐸  
−𝜀
∙ 𝑌𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑡               (14) 
𝑌𝑈𝑆 ,𝑡 = 𝜌2 ∙  
𝑃𝑈𝑆 ,𝑡
𝐸
𝑃𝐹 ,𝑡
$  
−𝜉
∙ 𝑌𝐹 ,𝑡                   (15) 
𝑌𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑡 = (1 − 𝜌2) ∙  
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑡
𝐸
𝑃𝐹 ,𝑡
$  
−𝜉
∙ 𝑌𝐹,𝑡                (16) 
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𝑌𝐻 ,𝑡 = (1 − 𝜌1) ∙  
𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝑃𝑡
 
−𝜔
∙ 𝑌𝑡                   (17) 
𝑌𝐹 ,𝑡 = 𝜌1 ∙  
𝑃𝐹 ,𝑡
$ ∙𝐸𝑋𝑡
𝑃𝑡
 
−𝜔
∙ 𝑌𝑡                    (18) 
where 𝑃𝐹 ,𝑡
$  is the aggregate price of foreign goods for China, denominated in US 
dollar; and 𝐸𝑋𝑡  is the exchange rate (US dollar to Renminbi). 
Since the final good producers are perfectly competitive and there is no profit for 
them, we can easily derive the following price index formulas: 
𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡 =   𝑃𝐻,𝑡(𝑖)
1−𝜀𝑑𝑖
1
0
 
1
1−𝜀
                   (19) 
𝑃𝑈𝑆 ,𝑡
𝐸 =   𝑃𝑈𝑆 ,𝑡
𝐸 (𝑖)1−𝜀𝑑𝑖
1
0
 
1
1−𝜀
                   (20) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑡
𝐸 =   𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑡
𝐸 (𝑖)1−𝜀𝑑𝑖
1
0
 
1
1−𝜀
                  (21) 
𝑃𝐹 ,𝑡
$ =   1 − 𝜌2 ∙ 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑡
𝐸 1−𝜉 + 𝜌2 ∙ 𝑃𝑈𝑆 ,𝑡
𝐸 1−𝜉  
1
1−𝜉
        (22) 
𝑃𝑡 =   1 − 𝜌1 ∙ 𝑃𝐻,𝑡
1−𝜔 + 𝜌1 ∙ (𝑃𝐹 ,𝑡
$ ∙ 𝐸𝑋𝑡)
1−𝜔  
1
1−𝜔            (23) 
In this paper we assume that three elasticities of substitution, 𝜀, 𝜉, and 𝜔, are 
the same across economies. Therefore, similarly we have the following expression: 
𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝐸 =   𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝐸 (𝑖)1−𝜀𝑑𝑖
1
0
 
1
1−𝜀
                    (24) 
Then the terms of trade for China’s economy can be defined as below: 
𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑡 = 𝑃𝐹 ,𝑡
$ /𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝐸                        (25) 
 
4.1.3. Intermediate-goods firms and prices setting 
 
Intermediate goods market is monopolistically competitive. Firm 𝑖  produces a 
differentiated intermediate good 𝑖 with a Cobb-Douglas production function: 
𝑌𝑡(𝑖) = 𝑎𝑡 ∙ 𝐾𝑡(𝑖)
1−𝛼 ∙  𝐿𝑡(𝑖) 
𝛼              (26) 
where a temporary productivity shock 𝑎𝑡  follows the following stochastic process: 
𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑡 = 𝜌𝑎 ∙ 𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑡
𝑎 , 𝑣𝑡
𝑎~𝑁(0,𝜎𝑎
2)       (27) 
The cost minimization problem is: given the prices of capital and labor, and the 
production function, equation (26),  
𝑚𝑖𝑛
 𝐾𝑡  𝑖 ,𝐿𝑡 (𝑖) 
𝑟𝑡 ∙ 𝐾𝑡 𝑖 +
𝑊𝑡
𝑃𝑡
∙ 𝐿𝑡(𝑖) 
Then FOCs of the problem are as follows: 
𝑟𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼) ∙ 𝑎𝑡 ∙  
𝐾𝑡 (𝑖)
𝐿𝑡 (𝑖)
 
−𝛼
∙ 𝑚𝑐𝑡(𝑖)           (28) 
𝑊𝑡
𝑃𝑡
= 𝛼 ∙ 𝑎𝑡 ∙  
𝐾𝑡 (𝑖)
𝐿𝑡 (𝑖)
 
1−𝛼
∙ 𝑚𝑐𝑡(𝑖)              (29) 
where 𝑚𝑐𝑡(𝑖) is the real marginal cost. Equation (28) and (29) can imply: 
17 
 
𝑊𝑡
𝑃𝑡 ∙𝑟𝑡
=
𝛼
1−𝛼
∙
𝐾𝑡 (𝑖)
𝐿𝑡 (𝑖)
                   (30) 
𝑚𝑐𝑡  𝑖 =
1
𝑎𝑡
∙
(1−𝛼)𝛼−1
𝛼𝛼
∙  
𝑊𝑡
𝑃𝑡
 
𝛼
∙ (𝑟𝑡 )
1−𝛼 ≡ 𝑚𝑐𝑡           (31) 
where the second part of equation (31) comes from the fact that the real marginal cost 
𝑚𝑐𝑡  𝑖  now does not depend on which kind of intermediate good it is, implying all 
the intermediate goods share the same real marginal cost.  
Intermediate-goods firms need to set prices for both domestically sold and export 
goods; and the price of domestically sold goods is denominated in Renminbi, while 
the export price is set in US dollar. As the same logic for PCP explained in Corsetti et 
al. (2011), firms will optimally choose identical prices for both their ROW and US 
markets, since demand elasticities for intermediate goods are assumed to be constant 
and symmetric across countries in this paper, which is 𝜀 . This is why in our 
benchmark model the same exported good from one country to different destinations 
have only one price. 
Following the staggered price setting of Calvo (1983), we assume each 
intermediate-goods firm may re-optimize its nominal prices, for both domestically 
sold and export, only with probability 1 − 𝜃 in any given period. With probability 𝜃, 
instead, the firm keeps its prices the same as in the previous period. Combining the 
fact that all firms resetting prices will choose an identical price combination 
(𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝑆 ,𝑃𝐻,𝑡
𝐸,𝑆) with equation (19), we can get: 
𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡 =  𝜃 ∙  𝑃𝐻,𝑡−1 
1−𝜀
+ (1 − 𝜃) ∙ 𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝑆 1−𝜀  
1
1−𝜀
            (32) 
At the deterministic steady state, 𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝑆 = 𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡 . So log-linearization of equation (32) 
will yield the following: 
𝛱𝐻,𝑡 = (1 − 𝜃) ∙  𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝑆 − 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡−1           (33) 
The price-resetting firm sets prices 𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝑆  and 𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝐸,𝑆
 to maximize the current 
market value of the profits generated while that price remains effective, which means 
it solves the following optimization problem: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
 𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝑆 ,𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝐸 ,𝑆   
 𝜃𝑘∞𝑘=0 ∙ 𝔼𝑡  𝐹𝑡 ,𝑡+𝑘 ∙  
𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝑆 ∙ 𝑌𝑡+𝑘 |𝑡
𝐷 +
𝑃𝐻,𝑡
𝐸,𝑆 ∙ 𝐸𝑋𝑡+𝑘 |𝑡 ∙ 𝑌𝑡+𝑘 |𝑡
𝐹 − Φ𝑡+𝑘(𝑌𝑡+𝑘 |𝑡)
   (34) 
subject to the sequence of demand constraints: 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑌𝑡+𝑘 |𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡+𝑘 |𝑡
𝐷 + 𝑌𝑡+𝑘 |𝑡
𝐹
𝑌𝑡+𝑘 |𝑡
𝐷 =  
𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝑆
𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡+𝑘
 
−𝜀
∙ 𝑌𝑡+𝑘
𝐷
𝑌𝑡+𝑘 |𝑡
𝐹 =  
𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝐸 ,𝑆
𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡+𝑘
𝐸  
−𝜀
∙ 𝑌𝑡+𝑘
𝐹
               (35) 
where 𝐹𝑡 ,𝑡+𝑘  is the discount factor for nominal payoffs; Φ𝑡+𝑘  is the nominal cost 
function; 𝑌𝑡+𝑘 |𝑡  denotes output in period 𝑡 + 𝑘 for a firm that last freely reset its 
price in period 𝑡, which equals domestic demand 𝑌𝑡+𝑘 |𝑡
𝐷  plus foreign demand 𝑌𝑡+𝑘|𝑡
𝐹 ; 
and 𝑌𝑡+𝑘
𝐷  and 𝑌𝑡+𝑘
𝐹  are respectively the total domestic and foreign demand for 
made-in-China goods. FOCs of the above problem are given by: 
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 𝜃𝑘 ∙ 𝔼𝑡  𝐹𝑡 ,𝑡+𝑘 ∙ 𝑌𝑡+𝑘 |𝑡
𝐷 ∙  𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝑆 − 𝜅 ∙ 𝛷𝑡+𝑘 |𝑡
′   ∞𝑘=0 = 0
 𝜃𝑘 ∙ 𝔼𝑡 𝐹𝑡,𝑡+𝑘 ∙ 𝑌𝑡+𝑘|𝑡
𝐹 ∙  𝑃𝐻,𝑡
𝐸,𝑆 ∙ 𝐸𝑋𝑡+𝑘 |𝑡 − 𝜅 ∙ 𝛷𝑡+𝑘 |𝑡
′   ∞𝑘=0 = 0
       (36) 
where Φ𝑡+𝑘 |𝑡
′ = Φ𝑡+𝑘
′ (𝑌𝑡+𝑘 |𝑡) is the nominal marginal cost in period 𝑡 + 𝑘 for a firm 
that last reset its price in period 𝑡 and Φ𝑡+𝑘 |𝑡
′ = 𝑃𝑡+𝑘 ∙ 𝑚𝑐𝑡+𝑘 |𝑡 , and 𝜿 = 𝜀/(𝜀 − 1) 
which can be interpreted as the desired or frictionless markup. When there is no price 
rigidity (𝜃 = 0), the above FOCs collapse to the familiar optimal price setting under 
flexible prices: 
 
𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝑆 = 𝜿 ∙ Φ𝑡|𝑡
′
𝑃𝐻,𝑡
𝐸,𝑆 = 𝜿 ∙ Φ𝑡|𝑡
′ /𝐸𝑋𝑡
  
The discount factor for nominal payoffs, 𝐹𝑡 ,𝑡+𝑘 , can be defined as follows: 
𝐹𝑡 ,𝑡+1 ≜
1
1+𝑅𝑡
= 𝔼𝑡  𝛽 ∙
𝐶𝑡
𝐶𝑡+1
∙
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡+1
                 (37) 
𝐹𝑡 ,𝑡+𝑘 ≜  𝐹𝑡+𝑖,𝑡+𝑖+1 =  
1
1+𝑅𝑡+𝑖
𝑘−1
𝑖=0
𝑘−1
𝑖=0               (38) 
where the second equality of equation (37) is derived from equation (5). 
In the zero-growth and zero-inflation steady state, 𝐸𝑋𝑡+𝑘 |𝑡 = 𝐸𝑋𝑡 = 𝐸𝑋 , 
𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝑆 = 𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡 , 𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝐸,𝑆 = 𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝐸 , and LOOP holds as well: 𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝑆 = 𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝐸,𝑆 ∙ 𝐸𝑋𝑡 . We view the 
home good, 𝑌𝐻 ,𝑡, as the numeraire, and at the steady state the relative prices of 
foreign goods, 𝑃𝑈𝑆 ,𝑡
𝐸 ∙ 𝐸𝑋𝑡/𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡 ≜ 𝜏𝑡
𝑈𝑆  and 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑡
𝐸 ∙ 𝐸𝑋𝑡/𝑃𝐻,𝑡 ≜ 𝜏𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 , will be 
constant numbers, 𝜏𝑈𝑆  and 𝜏𝑅𝑂𝑊  respectively . Then the first-order Taylor 
expansion of FOCs, equation (36), will yield the following result: 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝑆 − 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐻,𝑡−1 = 𝛽 ∙ 𝜃 ∙ 𝔼𝑡 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡+1
𝑆 − 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡 +
 1 − 𝛽 ∙ 𝜃 ∙  𝑚𝑐𝑡 + 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐻,𝑡 + 𝛱𝐻,𝑡
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐻,𝑡
𝐸,𝑆 − 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡−1
𝐸 = 𝛽 ∙ 𝜃 ∙ 𝔼𝑡 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐻,𝑡+1
𝐸,𝑆 − 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝐸  +
                  1 − 𝛽 ∙ 𝜃 ∙  𝑚𝑐𝑡 + 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑋𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝐸  + 𝛱𝐻,𝑡
𝐸
       (39) 
where 𝑚𝑐𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛(𝑚𝑐𝑡 ) − 𝑙𝑛(𝑚𝑐) is the log deviation of real marginal cost from its 
steady state value 𝑚𝑐, and 𝑚𝑐 = 1/𝜿 = (𝜀 − 1)/𝜀; 𝛱𝐻,𝑡 ≜ 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐻,𝑡−1 and 
𝛱𝐻,𝑡
𝐸 ≜ 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝐸 − 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡−1
𝐸  are respectively the home-made goods’ inflation rates for 
domestic price and export price.  
At the steady state we have the following: 
𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑡 = 𝑇𝑂𝑇 ≜   1 − 𝜌2 ∙ (𝜏
𝑅𝑂𝑊)1−𝜉 + 𝜌2 ∙ (𝜏
𝑈𝑆)1−𝜉  
1
1−𝜉  
𝑃𝑡/𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡 = 𝜏 ≜   1 − 𝜌1 + 𝜌1 ∙ (𝑇𝑂𝑇)
1−𝜔  
1
1−𝜔  
And around the steady state, equations (23) and (25) together can imply that:
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𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐻,𝑡+φ ∙ (𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡 + 𝑥𝑡)                (40) 
where φ ≜ 1 −
1−𝜌1
 1−𝜌1 +𝜌1∙(𝑇𝑂𝑇)
1−𝜔 ; 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡 ≜ 𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑡/𝑇𝑂𝑇)  and 𝑥𝑡 ≜ 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝐸 ∙ 𝐸𝑋𝑡/
𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡) can be called terms of trade gap and LOOP gap respectively, which are the log 
deviations from their corresponding steady state values. 
 
4.1.4. Dollar pricing, PCP, LCP and open-economy NKPC 
                                                           
6 In equation (40) and hereafter for any log-linearized equation, a constant term is omitted, since later on we will 
put the whole model into a cyclical representation where there is no constant term. 
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In a two-country model, dollar pricing is equivalent to the case that PCP is assumed 
for one country and LCP for the other. In our three-country model of this paper, the 
situation becomes more complicated. In fact, for US it is always PCP, for ROW it can 
be viewed as a partial LCP, and for China it is essentially PCP under the fixed 
exchange rate regime ad a partial LCP under the flexible exchange rate regime. To 
unify the analysis, we begin with the most general context.  
Equation (40), together with equation (33) and (39), will give the following 
open-economy New-Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC): 
𝛱𝐻,𝑡 = 𝛽 ∙ 𝔼𝑡 𝛱𝐻,𝑡+1 +
 1−𝜃 ∙ 1−𝛽∙𝜃 
𝜃
∙  𝑚𝑐𝑡 + φ ∙ (𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡 + 𝑥𝑡)      (41) 
Similarly, we can have another NKPC for export price: 
𝛱𝐻,𝑡
𝐸 = 𝛽 ∙ 𝔼𝑡 𝛱𝐻,𝑡+1
𝐸  +
 1−𝜃 ∙ 1−𝛽∙𝜃 
𝜃
∙  𝑚𝑐𝑡 − 𝑥𝑡 + φ ∙ (𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡 + 𝑥𝑡)     (42) 
Here the inflation rates of home-made goods do not only depend on their future 
expectations and the real marginal cost, but also depend on the terms of trade and 
LOOP gap.  
Particularly, for the benchmark setting with China’s fixed exchange rate regime, 
the pricing mechanism of China’s firms is in fact PCP, since the exchange rate of 
Renminbi 𝐸𝑋𝑡  is fixed as 𝐸𝑋, and choosing 𝑃𝐻,𝑡
𝐸,𝑆
 is equivalent to choose 𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝐸,𝑆 ∙ 𝐸𝑋. 
Under PCP, as explained in Corsetti et al. (2011), firms will optimally choose 
identical prices for both their domestic and export markets, and the LOOP will hold 
independently of barriers to markets integration. Therefore, 𝑥𝑡 ≡ 0 , and the 
open-economy NKPC with respect to the export goods’ price, which is equation (42), 
will degrade to and should be replaced by the following LOOP condition: 
𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝐸 ∙ 𝐸𝑋 = 𝑃𝐻,𝑡  
When China adopts a flexible exchange rate regime, equation (42) applies.  
 
4.1.5. Equilibrium and aggregation 
 
Government debt 𝐵𝑡  evolves according to: 
𝐵𝑡+1 =  1 + 𝑅𝑡−1 ∙ 𝐵𝑡 + 𝐺𝑡 − 𝑇𝑡               (43) 
For labor market and capital market, we have the following market clearing 
conditions: 
𝐿𝑡 =  𝐿𝑡 𝑖 
1
0
𝑑𝑖                     (44) 
𝐾𝑡+1 =  𝐾𝑡+1 𝑖 
1
0
𝑑𝑖 =  1 − 𝛿 ∙ 𝐾𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡              (45) 
We define the real GDP of China in the way below: 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 ≜   𝑌𝑡(𝑖)
𝜀−1
𝜀 𝑑𝑖
1
0
 
𝜀
𝜀−1
                   (46) 
And we also have the following aggregate demand equation: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡 + 𝐺𝑡/𝑃𝑡                       (47) 
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The market clearing condition for each intermediate good is: 
𝑌𝑡 𝑖 = 𝑌𝐻 ,𝑡 𝑖 + 𝑌𝐻 ,𝑡
𝑈𝑆  𝑖 + 𝑌𝐻 ,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 (𝑖)             (48) 
where 𝑌𝐻,𝑡
𝑗 (𝑖) is the demand of home-made intermediate good 𝑖 from country 𝑗. 
According to equation (12)-(18) and their counterparts for US and ROW economies, 
equation (48) is equivalent to the following: 
𝑌𝑡 𝑖 =  
𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡  𝑖 
𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
 
−𝜀
∙  1 − 𝜌1 ∙  
𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝑃𝑡
 
−𝜔
∙ 𝑌𝑡   
+  
𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝐸  𝑖 
𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝐸  
−𝜀
∙ 𝜌2
𝑈𝑆 ∙  
𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝐸
𝑃𝐹 ,𝑡
𝑈𝑆 
−𝜉
∙ 𝜌1
𝑈𝑆 ∙  
𝑃𝐹 ,𝑡
𝑈𝑆
𝑃𝑡
𝑈𝑆 
−𝜔
∙ 𝑌𝑡
𝑈𝑆   
+  
𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝐸  𝑖 
𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝐸  
−𝜀
∙ 𝜌2
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙  
𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝐸
𝑃𝐹 ,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊  
−𝜉
∙ 𝜌1
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙  
𝑃𝐹 ,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡
𝑃𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊  
−𝜔
∙ 𝑌𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊   (49) 
where 𝑃𝐹,𝑡
𝑗
, 𝑃𝑡
𝑗
, and 𝑌𝑡
𝑗
are respectively foreign good price, aggregate price, and 
aggregate demand of country 𝑗(= 𝑈𝑆 𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝑂𝑊) ; 𝜌1
𝑗
 and 𝜌2
𝑗
 are the country 𝑗’s 
degree of openness parameters; and 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡  is the exchange rate for the currency RO 
(US dollar to RO).  
Log-linearizing of equation (46), (49), (22) and (23) around the steady state 
when 𝑌𝑡 𝑖 = 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 , together with equation (40) and the corresponding counterpart 
equations for the other two economies, we can have the following log-linearized 
market clearing condition for China’s GDP: 
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 =
(1−𝜌1)∙𝜏
𝜔 ∙𝑌
𝐺𝐷𝑃
∙ [𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑡 + 𝜔 ∙ φ ∙ (𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡 + 𝑥𝑡)]  
+
𝜌2
𝑈𝑆 ∙𝜌1
𝑈𝑆 ∙𝜏1
𝜉
∙𝜏2
𝜔 ∙𝑌𝑈𝑆
𝐺𝐷𝑃
∙  
𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑡
𝑈𝑆 − 𝜉 ∙  1 − 𝜏5 ∙  𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝐸 − 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑡
𝐸  
−𝜔 ∙ (1 −φ𝑈𝑆) ∙ (𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡
𝑈𝑆 + 𝑥𝑡
𝑈𝑆)
    
+
𝜌2
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙𝜌1
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙𝜏3
𝜉
∙𝜏4
𝜔 ∙𝑌𝑅𝑂𝑊
𝐺𝐷𝑃
∙  
𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 − 𝜉 ∙  1 − 𝜏6 ∙  𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝐸 − 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑈𝑆 ,𝑡
𝐸  
−𝜔 ∙ (1 −φ𝑅𝑂𝑊) ∙ (𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 + 𝑥𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊)
    (50) 
where variables without subscript 𝑡 mean steady state values; 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡
𝑗
 and 𝑥𝑡
𝑗
 are 
respectively the terms of trade gap and LOOP gap for country 𝑗(= 𝑈𝑆 𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝑂𝑊); 
φ𝑈𝑆  and φ𝑅𝑂𝑊  are defined similarly to φ; constants 𝜏1 , 𝜏2, 𝜏3, 𝜏4, 𝜏5 , and 𝜏6 
are determined by steady state price ratios (𝜏𝑈𝑆 and 𝜏𝑅𝑂𝑊). 
Certainly the following identity holds: 
(1 − 𝜌1 ) ∙ 𝜏
𝜔 ∙ 𝑌 + 𝜌2
𝑈𝑆 ∙ 𝜌1
𝑈𝑆 ∙ 𝜏1
𝜉
∙ 𝜏2
𝜔 ∙ 𝑌𝑈𝑆 + 𝜌2
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙ 𝜌1
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙ 𝜏3
𝜉
∙ 𝜏4
𝜔 ∙ 𝑌𝑅𝑂𝑊 ≡ 𝐺𝐷𝑃 
This identity in fact tells that in the steady state the domestic GDP of China consists 
of three parts: domestic demand, demand from US and demand from ROW. Constants 
𝜏, 𝜏1, 𝜏2, 𝜏3, and 𝜏4 represent the relative price effects. However, in normal times 
equation (50) indicates that China’s GDP is also influenced by each economy’s terms 
of trade gap and LOOP gap, and by export price differentials (𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝐸 − 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑡
𝐸 , and 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝐸 − 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑈𝑆 ,𝑡
𝐸 ) as well. 
 
4.1.6. The external sector, current account and Central Bank’s balance sheet 
 
As China’s capital account is closed, the private sector is not allowed to hold foreign 
assets. Instead, exporters swap their US dollar proceeds for domestic currency 
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(Renminbi), and importers swap Renminbi for US dollar, with the Central Bank 
(PBOC) at par market values. If there is a trade surplus, then Central Bank will 
increase the supply of Renminbi, and use the net inflow of US dollar to buy more US 
government bonds. Then for the US economy, money supply is not changed, while the 
demand for its government bond is increased. Similarly, if there is a trade deficit, the 
Central Bank will decrease both the supply of Renminbi and the demand of US 
government bonds.  
Nominal net export of China, 𝑁𝑁𝑋𝑡 , is denominated in US dollar and defined as: 
𝑁𝑁𝑋𝑡 ≜ 𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝐸 ∙  𝑌𝐻 ,𝑡
𝑈𝑆 + 𝑌𝐻 ,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 − 𝑃𝐹 ,𝑡
$ ∙ 𝑌𝐹,𝑡                 (51) 
Then GDP deflator, 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑡 , can be defined as: 
𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑡 ≜ (𝑃𝑡 ∙ 𝑌𝑡 + 𝑁𝑁𝑋𝑡 ∙ 𝐸𝑋𝑡 )/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡                 (52) 
Since the nominal profit comes from the monopolistic power of intermediate-goods 
firms, we have the following identity: 
𝐷𝑡 = 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑡 ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 −𝑊𝑡 ∙ 𝐿𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡 ∙ 𝐾𝑡 ∙ 𝑟𝑡  
Combining the above equation with the budget constraint of the representative 
household, equation (2), we can get the national account identity as follows: 
𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑡 ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡 ∙ 𝐶𝑡 + 𝑃𝑡 ∙ 𝐼𝑡 + 𝐺𝑡 + (𝑀𝑡 −𝑀𝑡−1) 
As we will see in equation (57), the term of money growth, 𝑀𝑡 −𝑀𝑡−1 , is actually 
equal to the nominal net export denominated in Renminbi.  
Given the relationships between aggregate demand of one economy and its 
components, nominal net export of China 𝑁𝑁𝑋𝑡  then can be expressed as below: 
𝑁𝑁𝑋𝑡 = 𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝐸 ∙
 
 
 
 
 
 𝜌2
𝑈𝑆 ∙  
𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝐸
𝑃𝐹,𝑡
𝑈𝑆 
−𝜉
∙ 𝜌1
𝑈𝑆 ∙  
𝑃𝐹 ,𝑡
𝑈𝑆
𝑃𝑡
𝑈𝑆 
−𝜔
∙ 𝑌𝑡
𝑈𝑆 +
𝜌2
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙  
𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝐸
𝑃𝐹,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 
−𝜉
∙ 𝜌1
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙  
𝑃𝐹 ,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙ 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡
𝑃𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊  
−𝜔
∙ 𝑌𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
−𝑃𝐹 ,𝑡
$ ∙ 𝜌1 ∙  
𝑃𝐹 ,𝑡
$ ∙𝐸𝑋𝑡
𝑃𝑡
 
−𝜔
∙ 𝑌𝑡                  (53) 
So the steady state value of nominal net export, 𝑁𝑁𝑋, is: 
𝑁𝑁𝑋 = 𝑃𝐻
𝐸 ∙  
𝜌2
𝑈𝑆 ∙ 𝜌1
𝑈𝑆 ∙ 𝜏1
𝜉
∙ 𝜏2
𝜔 ∙ 𝑌𝑈𝑆 +
𝜌2
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙ 𝜌1
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙ 𝜏3
𝜉
∙ 𝜏4
𝜔 ∙ 𝑌𝑅𝑂𝑊 − 𝜌1 ∙ 𝑇𝑂𝑇
1−𝜔𝜏𝜔 ∙ 𝑌
     (54) 
The (nominal) current account surplus (𝐶𝐴𝑡) equals the trade surplus plus the net 
interest income received from holdings of US government bonds. Since the amount of 
foreign capital inflows equals the current account surplus, and Central Bank buys up 
any net inflow of US dollar from the private sector using Renminbi (the so-called 
non-sterilized foreign-exchange reserve intervention) and then exchanges US dollar 
for US government bond; we have the following:  
𝐶𝐴𝑡 ≜ 𝑁𝑁𝑋𝑡 + 𝑅𝑡−1
𝑈𝑆 ∙ 𝐵𝐻 ,𝑡
𝑈𝑆                   (55) 
𝐵𝐻 ,𝑡+1
𝑈𝑆 = 𝐶𝐴𝑡 + 𝐵𝐻 ,𝑡
𝑈𝑆                       (56) 
𝑀𝑡
𝑆 −𝑀𝑡−1
𝑆 = 𝐸𝑋𝑡 ∙  𝐵𝐻𝐶𝐵 ,𝑡+1
𝑈𝑆 − (1 + 𝑅𝑡−1
𝑈𝑆 ) ∙ 𝐵𝐻𝐶𝐵 ,𝑡
𝑈𝑆           (57) 
where 𝐵𝐻 ,𝑡
𝑈𝑆  denotes China’s foreign reserve, which here equals the Central Bank’s 
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holdings of US government bond at the period 𝑡, 𝐵𝐻𝐶𝐵 ,𝑡
𝑈𝑆 ; 𝑅𝑡−1
𝑈𝑆  is the interest rate of 
US government bond; and 𝑀𝑡
𝑆 is the money supply of Renminbi. In the benchmark 
setting, the exchange rate for Renminbi, 𝐸𝑋𝑡 , is assumed to be fixed at its 
steady-state level: 𝐸𝑋𝑡 = 𝐸𝑋. 
 
4.2. The economies of US and rest of the world (ROW) 
 
While many ingredients of the model economies of US and ROW are similar to 
China’s above, there are some structural differences due to the differences in 
institutional arrangements. Except that three elasticities of substitution, 𝜀, 𝜉, and 𝜔, 
are assumed to be the same across economies, we allow for differences in other 
structural parameters such as the degree of openness, Calvo price stickiness and 
households preference parameters.  
Particularly, for the open-economy NKPCs of country 𝑗(= 𝑈𝑆 𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝑂𝑊), we 
have the following expressions, as the counterparts of equation (41) and (42): 
𝛱𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑗 = 𝛽 𝑗 ∙ 𝔼𝑡 𝛱𝑗 ,𝑡+1
𝑗  +
 1−𝜃𝑗  ∙ 1−𝛽 𝑗 ∙𝜃𝑗  
𝜃𝑗
∙  𝑚𝑐𝑡
𝑗 + φ𝑗 ∙ (𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡
𝑗 + 𝑥𝑡
𝑗 )      (58) 
𝛱𝑗 ,𝑡
𝐸 = 𝛽 𝑗 ∙ 𝔼𝑡 𝛱𝑗 ,𝑡+1
𝐸  +
 1−𝜃𝑗  ∙ 1−𝛽 𝑗 ∙𝜃𝑗  
𝜃𝑗
∙  𝑚𝑐𝑡
𝑗 − 𝑥𝑡
𝑗 + φ𝑗 ∙ (𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡
𝑗 + 𝑥𝑡
𝑗 )     (59) 
where variables and parameters with superscript (or subscript) 𝑗  denote the 
corresponding variables and parameters for country 𝑗  which are defined in the 
similar way to those for China’s economy. It is worth pointing out that for US 
equation (59) will degenerate to the LOOP condition: 𝑃𝑈𝑆 ,𝑡
𝐸 = 𝑃𝑈𝑆 ,𝑡
$ , since the logic of 
PCP holds here. 
Similarly, as the counterparts of equation (50), aggregate demand equations for 
US and ROW can be expressed as follows: 
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
𝑈𝑆 =
(1−𝜌1
𝑈𝑆 )∙(
𝜏1 ∙𝜏2
𝜏𝑈𝑆
)𝜔 ∙𝑌𝑈𝑆
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑈𝑆
∙ [𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑡
𝑈𝑆 + 𝜔 ∙ φ𝑈𝑆 ∙ (𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡
𝑈𝑆 + 𝑥𝑡
𝑈𝑆)]  
+
𝜌2∙𝜌1∙(
𝑇𝑂𝑇
𝜏𝑈𝑆
)𝜉 ∙(
𝜏
𝑇𝑂 𝑇
)𝜔 ∙𝑌
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑈𝑆
∙  
𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑡 − 𝜉 ∙  1 − 𝜏7 ∙  𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑈𝑆 ,𝑡
𝐸 − 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑡
𝐸  
−𝜔 ∙ (1 − φ1) ∙ (𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡 + 𝑥𝑡)
    
+
(1−𝜌2
𝑅𝑂𝑊 )∙𝜌1
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙(
𝜏3
𝜏𝑈𝑆
)𝜉 ∙(𝜏4)
𝜔 ∙𝑌𝑅𝑂𝑊
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑈𝑆
∙  
𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 − 𝜉 ∙ 𝜏6 ∙  𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑈𝑆 ,𝑡
𝐸 − 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝐸  
−𝜔 ∙ (1 −φ𝑅𝑂𝑊) ∙ (𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 + 𝑥𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊)
    (60) 
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 =
(1−𝜌1
𝑅𝑂𝑊 )∙(
𝜏3 ∙𝜏4
𝜏𝑅𝑂𝑊
)𝜔 ∙𝑌𝑅𝑂𝑊
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑊
∙ [𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 + 𝜔 ∙ φ𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙ (𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 + 𝑥𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊)]  
+
(1−𝜌2)∙𝜌1∙(
𝑇𝑂𝑇
𝜏𝑅𝑂𝑊
)𝜉 ∙(
𝜏
𝑇𝑂𝑇
)𝜔 ∙𝑌
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑊
∙  
𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑡 − 𝜉 ∙ 𝜏7 ∙  𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑡
𝐸 − 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑈𝑆 ,𝑡
𝐸  
−𝜔 ∙ (1 − φ) ∙ (𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡 + 𝑥𝑡)
    
+
(1−𝜌2
𝑈𝑆 )∙𝜌1
𝑈𝑆 ∙(
𝜏1
𝜏𝑅𝑂𝑊
)𝜉 ∙𝜏2
𝜔 ∙𝑌𝑈𝑆
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑊
∙  
𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑡
𝑈𝑆 − 𝜉 ∙ 𝜏5 ∙  𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑡
𝐸 − 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝐸  
−𝜔 ∙ (1 −φ𝑈𝑆 ) ∙ (𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡
𝑈𝑆 + 𝑥𝑡
𝑈𝑆)
    (61) 
Since we assume there is no capital control for US and ROW, the households of 
ROW are allowed to buy US bonds. To capture home bias in the household’s portfolio 
choice, following Chang et al. (2013) we assume in this paper that domestic bonds 
23 
 
and US bonds are imperfect substitutes.
7
 It is costly to adjust the share of domestic 
bonds in the household’s portfolio away from the steady-state allocation, which is 
assumed to be the first best for the household. Therefore, the budget constraint for the 
representative household of ROW is as follows, as the counterpart of equation (2): 
𝑃𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙ 𝐶𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 + 𝑃𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙ 𝐾𝑡+1
𝑅𝑂𝑊 + 𝑇𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 + 𝑀𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊  
+ 𝐵𝑡+1
𝑅𝑂𝑊 + 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡 ∙ 𝐵𝑅𝑃 ,𝑡+1
𝑈𝑆   1 +
Ω𝑅𝑂𝑊
2
 
𝐵𝑡+1
𝑅𝑂𝑊
𝐵𝑡+1
𝑅𝑂𝑊 + 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡 ∙ 𝐵𝑅𝑃,𝑡+1
𝑈𝑆 −𝜓
𝑅𝑂𝑊 
2
  
≤  1 − 𝛿𝑅𝑂𝑊 + 𝑟𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙ 𝑃𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙ 𝐾𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 + 𝑊𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙ 𝐿𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 +  1 + 𝑅𝑡−1
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙ 𝐵𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊  
+ 1 + 𝑅𝑡−1
𝑈𝑆  ∙ 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡 ∙ 𝐵𝑅𝑃 ,𝑡
𝑈𝑆 + 𝐷𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 + 𝑀𝑡−1
𝑅𝑂𝑊              (62) 
where variables and parameters with superscript 𝑅𝑂𝑊 denote the corresponding 
variables and parameters for country ROW, which are defined in the similar way to 
those for China’s economy; 𝐵𝑅𝑃 ,𝑡
𝑈𝑆  is the private holdings of US government bonds 
for country ROW; Ω𝑅𝑂𝑊  is a parameter measuring the size of the portfolio 
adjustment cost; the household’s portfolio share of domestic bonds is denoted by 
𝜓𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ≡ 𝐵𝑡+1
𝑅𝑂𝑊/(𝐵𝑡+1
𝑅𝑂𝑊 + 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡 ∙ 𝐵𝑅𝑃 ,𝑡+1
𝑈𝑆 ); and 𝜓𝑅𝑂𝑊  is the steady-state portfolio 
share of domestic bonds held by ROW households. Then the first order conditions 
with respect to the optimal choices of 𝐵𝑡+1
𝑅𝑂𝑊  and 𝐵𝑅𝑃 ,𝑡+1
𝑈𝑆  for the ROW 
representative household are given by: 
1 +
Ω𝑅𝑂𝑊
2
 𝜓𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 −𝜓𝑅𝑂𝑊 2 + Ω𝑅𝑂𝑊 𝜓𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 −𝜓𝑅𝑂𝑊  1 −𝜓𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊  
= (1 + 𝑅𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊)𝔼𝑡  
𝜆𝑡+1
𝜆𝑡
  
1 +
Ω𝑅𝑂𝑊
2
 𝜓𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 −𝜓𝑅𝑂𝑊 2 − Ω𝑅𝑂𝑊 𝜓𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 −𝜓𝑅𝑂𝑊 𝜓𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊  
= (1 + 𝑅𝑡
𝑈𝑆)𝔼𝑡  
𝜆𝑡+1 ∙ 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡+1
𝜆𝑡 ∙ 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡
  
where 𝜆𝑡  is the Lagrangian multiplier of the dynamic maximization problem (also 
can be interpreted as the marginal utility of nominal wealth), and it satisfies the 
following two FOCs as well:
8
 
𝔼𝑡  𝛽
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙
𝐶𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊
𝐶𝑡+1
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙
𝑃𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊
𝑃𝑡+1
𝑅𝑂𝑊 = 𝔼𝑡  
𝜆𝑡+1
𝜆𝑡
  
𝑀𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊
𝑃𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙ 𝐶𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 [1 − 𝔼𝑡  
𝜆𝑡+1
𝜆𝑡
 ] = 𝜙2
𝑅𝑂𝑊    
Log-linearizing above FOCs around the steady state when 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡  and 
𝑅𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 = 𝑅𝑡
𝑈𝑆  gives the following modified UIP condition: 
𝑅𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 = 𝑅𝑡
𝑈𝑆 + 𝔼𝑡 𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡+1 − 𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡 + Ω
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙ 𝜓𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙ 𝜓𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊     (63) 
where 𝜓𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊  is the percent deviation of the portfolio share of domestic bonds from 
its steady-state level, and according to the definition of 𝜓𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊  the following equation 
                                                           
7 Imperfect asset mobility is introduced into open-economy DSGE models also for the reason to avoid an 
indetermination of the net foreign asset holdings at the steady state and instability of the dynamic system in 
absence of perfect international risk-sharing (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2003). 
8 There are two other FOCs which take the similar forms of equation (3) and (4). 
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holds: 
𝜓𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 =  1 −𝜓𝑅𝑂𝑊 (𝐵𝑡+1
𝑅𝑂𝑊 −𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡 ) −𝜓
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙
𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑊
𝐵𝑅𝑂𝑊
∙ 𝐵𝑅𝑃,𝑡+1
𝑈𝑆  
where 𝐵𝑅𝑃,𝑡+1
𝑈𝑆  is defined as the deviation of the following ratio from its steady-state 
value: 
(𝐸𝑋𝑅 ∙ 𝐵𝑅𝑃 ,𝑡+1
𝑈𝑆 )/(𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑊) 
The modified UIP condition, equation (63), tells that the spread on ROW bonds 
versus US bonds depends not only on the expected depreciation of ROW currency, 
but also on the changes in the portfolio share. Since the adjustment of portfolio share 
is costly, the household should be compensated with a higher relative interest rate to 
be willing to hold more domestic bonds. Therefore, the interest rate differential 
(𝑅𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 − 𝑅𝑡
𝑈𝑆) is positively related with portfolio share deviation. In fact, equation 
(63) can also represent a downward-sloping demand curve for domestic ROW bonds 
relative to foreign US bonds. When there is an increase in the interest rate differential 
(𝑅𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 − 𝑅𝑡
𝑈𝑆), implying the price of domestic ROW bonds decreases, the demand for 
domestic ROW bonds relative to foreign US bonds will be raised, holding expected 
exchange rate movements unchanged.  
For ROW the US bonds are held by both the central bank and the households, 
and the sum of private and public holdings of US bonds equal this economy’s foreign 
reserves: 
𝐵𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑡
𝑈𝑆 = 𝐵𝑅𝑃 ,𝑡
𝑈𝑆 + 𝐵𝑅𝐶𝐵 ,𝑡
𝑈𝑆                       (64) 
where 𝐵𝑅𝐶𝐵 ,𝑡
𝑈𝑆  is the ROW central bank’s  holdings of US bonds. And the 
relationships among the foreign reserves, balance sheet of the central bank and net 
export for ROW are given by the following:  
𝐵𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑡+1
𝑈𝑆 = 𝑁𝑁𝑋𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 + (1 + 𝑅𝑡−1
𝑈𝑆 ) ∙ 𝐵𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑡
𝑈𝑆            (65) 
𝑀𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑆 −𝑀𝑡−1
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑆 = 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡 ∙  𝐵𝑅𝐶𝐵 ,𝑡+1
𝑈𝑆 − (1 + 𝑅𝑡−1
𝑈𝑆 ) ∙ 𝐵𝑅𝐶𝐵 ,𝑡
𝑈𝑆         (66) 
where 𝑀𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑆
 is the money supply of the economy ROW. If the ROW private 
holdings of US bonds are zero, the above relationships collapse to the same as China’s 
case. 
Because US dollar serves as the global reserve currency, we assume that for US 
households there is a complete home bias of government bonds and they will not buy 
the bonds from ROW. So the budget constraint for the representative household of US 
is similar to China’s. We can see that even when the world trade is temporarily not 
balanced and for example there is a trade surplus for China and ROW, the US dollar 
flowing outside US will finally flow back into the US economy and the quantity of 
money supply of US dollar within the US economy keeps unchanged. However, the 
demand of US government bonds will be affected. When there is a trade deficit for 
US, the foreign demand of US bonds will increase: US consumes more than its 
production, while other economies save in the form of buying US bonds. So we have 
the following identity: 
𝐵𝑡
𝑈𝑆 = 𝐵𝐻 ,𝑡
𝑈𝑆 + 𝐵𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑡
𝑈𝑆 + 𝐵𝑈𝑆 ,𝑡
𝑈𝑆                  (67) 
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𝐵𝑈𝑆 ,𝑡
𝑈𝑆 = 𝐵𝑈𝑃 ,𝑡
𝑈𝑆 + 𝐵𝑈𝐶𝐵 ,𝑡
𝑈𝑆                     (68) 
where 𝐵𝑡
𝑈𝑆 is the aggregate demand of US bonds, which consists of three parts: 
demand from China (here equals demand from China’s central bank), from ROW 
(including private and public holdings) and US domestic demand (𝐵𝑈𝑆 ,𝑡
𝑈𝑆 , which equals 
US private demand 𝐵𝑈𝑃 ,𝑡
𝑈𝑆  plus US central bank’s demand 𝐵𝑈𝐶𝐵 ,𝑡
𝑈𝑆 ). So the balance 
sheet of US Federal Reserve expands in the following way: 
𝑀𝑡
𝑈𝑆 ,𝑆 −𝑀𝑡−1
𝑈𝑆 ,𝑆 = 𝐵𝑈𝐶𝐵 ,𝑡+1
𝑈𝑆 − (1 + 𝑅𝑡−1
𝑈𝑆 ) ∙ 𝐵𝑈𝐶𝐵 ,𝑡
𝑈𝑆          (69) 
In the benchmark model, we assume the real money supply of US dollar is an AR(1) 
process and subject to a stochastic shock: 
𝑙𝑛(𝑀𝑡
𝑈𝑆 ,𝑆/𝑃𝑡
𝑈𝑆) = 𝜌𝑀𝑈 ∙ 𝑙𝑛(𝑀𝑡−1
𝑈𝑆 ,𝑆/𝑃𝑡−1
𝑈𝑆 ) + 
 1 − 𝜌𝑀𝑈 ∙ 𝑙𝑛(𝑀
𝑈𝑆/𝑃𝑈𝑆) + 𝑣𝑡
𝑀𝑈 ,𝑣𝑡
𝑀𝑈~𝑁(0,𝜎𝑀𝑈
2 )          (70) 
where 𝑀𝑈𝑆  is the steady-state level of US money supply.  
Given the budget constraints for all the three economies’ representative 
households and the aggregate demand equation for US bonds, we can derive an 
identity linking three economies’ nominal net exports: 
𝑁𝑁𝑋𝑡 + 𝑁𝑁𝑋𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 + 𝑁𝑁𝑋𝑡
𝑈𝑆 = 0                  (71) 
 
4.3. Fiscal policies 
 
To make the benchmark model tractable and concentrate on monetary policy issues, 
we deal with fiscal policies of each economy in a simple way. Take China as an 
example. We define the debt-GDP ratio 𝑏𝑡 , government expenditure-GDP ratio 𝑔𝑡 , 
and fiscal revenue-GDP ratio as follows: 
𝑏𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡/(𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑡 ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 ) 
𝑔𝑡 = 𝐺𝑡/(𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑡 ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 ) 
𝑓𝑟𝑡 = 𝑇𝑡/(𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑡 ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 ) 
Then 𝑔𝑡  is assumed to follow an 𝐴𝑅(1) process: 
𝑙𝑛(𝑔𝑡) =  1 − 𝜌𝐺 ∙ 𝑙𝑛(𝑔) + 𝜌𝐺 ∙ 𝑙𝑛(𝑔𝑡−1) + 𝑣𝑡
𝐺 ,𝑣𝑡
𝐺~𝑁(0,𝜎𝐺
2)   (72) 
And the tax rule of the government is exogenously given as well. The fiscal revenue 
reacts to, with one-period lag, the deviation of debt-GDP ratio from its target 𝑏: 
𝑓𝑟𝑡
𝑓𝑟
=  
𝑏𝑡 −1
𝑏
 
𝜀𝑇
                       (73) 
where 𝑓𝑟  is the steady-state level of fiscal revenue-GDP ratio, and 𝜀𝑇  is the 
elasticity. Equation (43) can yield that: 𝑓𝑟 = 𝑔 + 𝑅 ∙ 𝑏. 
 
4.4. Monetary policies, exchange rates determination and model stability  
 
Monetary policies are related to both the determination of exchange rates and the 
saddle path stability of the global model in our framework. For an economy in a 
monetary DSGE model, normally either a Taylor-type interest rate rule or a rule for 
money supply is considered. The existence and uniqueness of a stable path of a 
dynamic model is a holistic phenomenon, depending on the interaction of all agents’ 
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behaviors. In a closed economy, the Taylor principle (nominal interest rate set by the 
monetary authority should respond more than one-to-one to inflation) usually makes 
the model satisfy the Blanchard-Kahn conditions (one of these conditions is that the 
number of explosive eigenvalues of the dynamic system should be equal to the 
number of non-predetermined variables), which guarantee the stability and 
determinacy of the dynamic system. In an open economy, interest rate rule also plays 
a role in determining the exchange rate of currencies through a certain equilibrium 
condition such as uncovered interest rate parity. In some circumstance, a money 
supply rule can be an alternative to the interest rate rule, and money supply works as a 
policy instrument to determine nominal interest rate and exchange rate. Involved with 
money supply policy and exchange rate regime, the so called “impossible trinity” was 
widely discussed in old Keynesian literature, such as in the Mundell-Fleming 
framework. In the benchmark setting of this paper, three asymmetric economies with 
different monetary institutional arrangements and different degrees of openness are 
interacting. So the situation would be more complicated. 
 
4.4.1. Monetary policies and exchange rates determination 
 
For the three economies in the benchmark model, they are assumed to have different 
types of monetary policies, due to their different institutional arrangements and this 
paper’s research interest. Then the exchange rate determination mechanisms for 
different currencies are not the same as well.  
Since we have a special interest of US money supply shock’s effect on China’s 
economy, the monetary policy for US is a money supply rule, described by equation 
(70). The US monetary authority can influence the nominal interest rate of US bonds 
through the money supply of US dollar.  
For China, fixed exchange rate regime is assumed for the benchmark setting. 
And the money supply of Renminbi passively expands or shrinks due to China’s trade 
surplus or deficit, since there are capital controls and exchange settlement and sales 
are compulsory. Equations (55) to (57) depict this mechanism. Given the money 
supply of Renminbi, equation (6) determines the nominal interest rate for China, 
holding other variables unchanged. For example, when there is a trade surplus for 
China, the money supply will increase and nominal interest rate of China will 
decrease. This is a kind of monetary expansion policy, although it is “passive”. And a 
lower interest rate will stimulate Chinese households to consume more and Chinese 
firms to invest more, which will consequently increase China’s aggregate demand and 
import. Then net export of China will decrease and the trade has a tendency to be 
balanced.  
In an upcoming part of this paper China’s policy reforms will be explored, and a 
floating exchange rate regime or an opened capital account for China will be 
considered. If the capital account is opened and Chinese households are allowed to 
freely buy US bonds, a modified UIP condition like equation (63) will play a role in 
the determination of Renminbi’s exchange rate. If China adopts a flexible exchange 
rate regime (while the capital control is maintained), the exchange rate of Renminbi 
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will be determined by the market clearing condition of China’s GDP, equation (50); 
since the exchange rate of Renminbi reflects the relative price between Chinese goods 
and foreign goods, and it can influence the domestic demand of China’s GDP. In this 
circumstance, when there is a trade surplus for China, the money supply will increase 
and simultaneously Renminbi will appreciate. Given the money demand function, 
equation (6), and a Taylor-type interest rate rule which is to replace the fixed 
exchange rate condition, an expanded money supply will push up the aggregate price 
level for China. So Renminbi will also “depreciate” relative to domestic goods. The 
appreciation of Renminbi relative to US dollar and its “depreciation” relative to 
domestic goods will unambiguously make China’s import increase, which will then 
lead to the closure of China’s trade gap.  
For ROW which adopts a flexible exchange rate regime and whose households 
can get access to US bond market, a Taylor-type interest rate rule is assumed. In a 
stylized two-country NOEM model with perfect assets substitution, such as Corsetti et 
al. (2011), the exchange rate is determined by the equilibrium risk-sharing condition, 
or equivalently the normal UIP condition, given the monetary policies in the two 
countries. In our three-country model with imperfect assets substitution here the 
circumstance becomes more complicated. The modified UIP condition, equation (63), 
links the interest rate differential, exchange rate and the private holdings of foreign 
bonds. Therefore, given the monetary policies of all the countries, this modified UIP 
condition and market clearing conditions for US bonds determine the exchange rate of 
Ro and ROW private holdings of US bonds together.  
 
4.4.2. Monetary policies and model stability 
 
Monetary policies are related to the saddle path stability of our global model as well. 
Not as in a closed economy, the Taylor principle for the monetary policy is not 
necessarily a sufficient condition any more for the existence and uniqueness of a 
stable path for open-economy dynamic systems. For example, in a two-country model 
of Carton (2011), the dynamic system is unstable under certain circumstances, if the 
net foreign asset position is absent in monetary policy.  
 Given the fixed exchange rate regime and compulsory exchange settlement and 
sales for China and a money supply rule described by equation (70) for US in the 
benchmark model, a Taylor-type interest rate rule for ROW is assumed. And ROW 
monetary policy rule must be a forward looking rule (i.e. to react to the expectations 
of output gap and inflation gap of ROW) to make the global dynamic system achieve 
saddle-path stability for the calibrations to come in this paper. To be specific, the 
monetary policy for ROW is set as below:  
𝑅𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 = 𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑊 + 𝜑1
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙  𝔼𝑡  𝛱𝑡+𝑗
𝑅𝑂𝑊  /44𝑗=1   
+𝜑2
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙  𝔼𝑡 (𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡+𝑗
𝑅𝑂𝑊)/44𝑗=1 + 𝑣𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑡
𝑅           (74) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑊  is the steady-state level of nominal interest rate for ROW, and 𝛱𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊  
and 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊  are the inflation gap and real GDP gap of ROW respectively. 
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4.5. Steady state of the global economy 
 
In this paper we assume neither real GDP growth nor positive inflation at the steady 
state. And it is also assumed that at the steady state the foreign asset (US bonds) 
holdings for China and ROW are zero, which implies complete asset home bias 
(𝜓𝑅𝑂𝑊 = 1) at the steady state and results in a balanced global trade at the steady 
state as well. 
 Since there is no real GDP growth at the steady state but in reality all the 
economies are growing (particularly, China is growing quite fast), great ratios such as 
the consumption-GDP ratio and investment-GDP ratio for all the three economies at 
the steady state cannot be calibrated to match the data. We assume the government 
spending-GDP ratio is 20% for all the economies at the steady state. Given the 
equilibrium conditions and the values of some parameters (such as the capital 
depreciation rate), the steady-state investment-GDP ratio for each economy and many 
other aggregate variables’ steady-state values can be calculated.  
 Two relative prices at the steady state, 𝜏𝑅𝑂𝑊 and 𝜏𝑈𝑆, are important, and they 
determine many coefficients of the log-linearized representation of the benchmark 
model. Given the steady-state values for any two economies’ net nominal export, 
equation (54) and its analogue for ROW (or US) provide an equation group to solve 
𝜏𝑅𝑂𝑊 and 𝜏𝑈𝑆. 
 
4.6. Mapping from the benchmark model to GVAR 
 
Three economies of the world interact, and are linked through international trade and 
international financial market. And the global linkages are endogenized in our global 
DSGE framework, rather than exogenously given in traditional GVAR models. In the 
benchmark model, US dollar serves as a global currency, which is the only invoicing 
currency in the international trade and the only foreign exchange reserve currency. 
Log-linearizing the DSGE model for each economy will lead to a VARX* model for 
this economy, which takes the following form: 
𝔼𝑡  ℱ𝛩(𝑗 )
𝑗  𝑋𝑡+1
𝑗 ,𝑋𝑡
𝑗 ,𝑋𝑡−1
𝑗 ,𝑋𝑡+1
𝑗1 ,𝑋𝑡
𝑗1 ,𝑋𝑡−1
𝑗1 ,𝑋𝑡+1
𝑗2 ,𝑋𝑡
𝑗2 ,𝑋𝑡−1
𝑗2 ,𝛯𝑡
𝑗   = 0 
where 𝑋𝑡
𝑗
 is a vector of all the endogenous variables for economy 
𝑗(= 𝐻,𝑈𝑆 𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝑂𝑊), 𝑋𝑡
𝑗  is its corresponding cyclical component vector,  𝑗1, 𝑗2 =
 𝐻,𝑈𝑆,𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∖  𝑗 , 𝛯𝑡
𝑗 ~𝑖𝑖𝑑(0, Σ𝑗 ) is a random vector of structural innovations for 
economy 𝑗, and ℱ𝛩(𝑗 )
𝑗
 is a linear real function parameterized by a real vector Θ(𝑗) 
gathering the deep parameters of the model for economy 𝑗. This VARX* model is 
stochastic, forward-looking and linear.  
Piling up all the three VARX* models for three economies, we can get the 
following GVAR model: 
𝔼𝑡 ℱ𝛩 𝑋𝑡+1 ,𝑋𝑡 ,𝑋𝑡−1 ,𝛯𝑡  = 0 
where 𝑋𝑡 = ( 𝑋𝑡
𝐻 ′ ,  𝑋𝑡
𝑈𝑆 ′ , (𝑋𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊)′)′  collects all the endogenous variables for the 
29 
 
whole global economy, and 𝛯𝑡  then gathers all the deep parameters in the global 
DSGE model. The solution of the above GVAR model is (or can be numerically 
approximated as) a VAR(1) process: 
𝑋𝑡 = ℋ𝛩 𝑋𝑡−1 ,𝛯𝑡  
 
5. CALIBRATION 
 
The parameters of the cyclical global DSGE model fall into three categories: Category 
1-basic structural parameters such as preference parameters, and some other 
parameters, which need be exogenously provided; Category 2-steady state values of 
aggregate variables, which are set to match the data (mainly the data of the year 2012 
for the benchmark model); and Category 3-other parameters which are determined by 
the above two categories, given the steady state equilibrium conditions. Parameter 
values are specified on a quarterly model.                          
Category 1 parameters for the three economies are listed in Table 5 in the 
appendix. There are three elasticities assumed to be the same across economies: the 
elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods in one single economy 𝜀, the 
elasticity of substitution between goods from different foreign economies 𝜉, and the 
elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods 𝜔. As in many New 
Keynesian DSGE models, 𝜀 is calibrated to be 11, leading to a 10% steady-state 
markup over marginal cost. For 𝜉, Collard and Dellas (2002) suggest a value between 
one and two, so we use 1.5. For 𝜔, micro data typically indicates a value in the range 
of 5 to 10 (Funke et al., 2010); and Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) have shown that such 
high elasticity can explain an observed large home bias in trade. So we set it to be 6 at 
the beginning. The inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply, 𝜂, is set to be 1.0 for 
all the three economies. In terms of labor share in production function, for China it is 
set to be 0.5, as in Chen et al. (2012) and indicating a relatively low output elasticity 
of labor in China
9
; and for US and ROW, we use a standard calibration, 0.67. The 
Calvo parameter is set to be 0.75 for China implying an average adjustment of prices 
every year and consistent with Chen et al. (2012), and to be 0.5 for US and ROW as 
normal. We set the depreciation rate of capital to a value of 5% for China
10
 and 2.5% 
for the other two economies. The AR(1) persistence parameters are all set to be 0.7. 
The parameters of monetary policy rule for ROW are set to be 1.5 and 0.2, consistent 
with the literature. The government spending-GDP ratio at the steady state is 20% for 
all the economies. In terms of the elasticity in the tax rule, it is set to be 0.2 for each 
economy.  
We set a baseline value for 𝜌1 (degree of openness for China) of 0.3 and for 𝜌2 
of 0.247, which indicate that: when the prices of home goods and foreign goods are 
the same, import of China is about 30%
11
 of its total demand (which means home 
                                                           
9 He et al. (2007) and Mehrotra et al. (2011) use an even smaller value, 0.4.  
10 This high depreciation rate is in line with the economic reality of China. As an example in the electronics sector, 
capital is sometimes assumed to depreciate fully in just three years. He et al. (2005) suggest a capital depreciation 
rate of 5% for China. 
11According to the 2011 data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, imported goods (service excluded) 
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bias exists); and when the prices of imported goods from US and ROW are the same, 
China’s import share from these two economies is proportional to their GDP size 
(steady-state GDP levels for the three economies in the year 2012 are given by Table 
6). For US and ROW, the specification is as follows: 𝜌1
𝑈𝑆 = 0.265, 𝜌2
𝑈𝑆 = 0.147; 
𝜌1
𝑅𝑂𝑊 = 0.113, 𝜌2
𝑅𝑂𝑊 = 0.344 . The rationality of this kind of specification is 
explained in Appendix A1. 
Two parameters (𝜓𝑅𝑂𝑊and Ω𝑅𝑂𝑊) in the modified UIP condition, equation (63), 
are calibrated as follows. The steady-state portfolio share of domestic bonds held by 
ROW households 𝜓𝑅𝑂𝑊  is set to be 1.0, meaning that there are zero foreign asset 
holdings at the steady state, This guarantees a balanced global trade at the steady state 
for our model. The portfolio adjustment cost parameter Ω𝑅𝑂𝑊  is set to be 0.22, in 
line with Chang et al. (2013) which estimate this parameter from a panel data set of 
22 countries with a sample period from 2001 to 2011.
12
 
Category 2 parameters for the three economies are listed in Table 6 in the 
appendix. The nominal GDP of China denominated in US dollar in 2012 is 
normalized to be unit. According to the IMF data, in 2012 the GDP of US and ROW 
are respectively 1.91 times and 5.81 times of China’s. In terms of steady-state nominal 
interest rate, for all the three economies it is set to be 4% annually, and thus the 
quarterly rate is 1%. For government debt-GDP ratios, we refer to the IMF report 
Fiscal Monitor (IMF, 2013) and use the 2012 data. For US, it is 106.5%. For China, it 
is 22.8%, but sub-national debt is not included. So we use a higher value, 40%, for 
China. Then given the world average ratio 81.1% and world’s GDP distribution, we 
can calculate that for ROW the debt-GDP ratio is about 79.8%. Since our model is a 
quarterly one, all these ratios are amplified by 4 times. The steady-state exchange rate 
of Renminbi is set to be 6.3, the average value for the year 2012. For ROW currency, 
Ro, its steady-state exchange rate is set to be 1 for simplicity, since exchange rate is 
just a relative price of currencies and its concrete steady-state value will not affect the 
whole model.  
In Table 6 the ratio of money stock to nominal GDP in the steady state is set to 
match the M0-GDP ratio data in 2012. For China this ratio is 10.5%, for US it is 6.7%, 
and for ROW we take a value of 15%.
13
 Finally we amplify these ratios by 4 times in 
accord with our quarterly model. Here we use M0 as the index of US money supply 
for three reasons: one is to make it consistent with our previous empirical GVAR 
analysis; the second reason is that: in our model there is capital accumulation and 
capital stock is owned by the households as saving, so in the model money as another 
kind of asset to the households is better to denote currency rather than more broadly 
defined moneys which include households’ savings; and finally, in our model money 
is totally supplied by the central banks as their liabilities, so M0 rather than M1 or M2 
is a better indicator.
14
 In a coming section of sensitivity analysis, M1-GDP ratios will 
                                                                                                                                                                       
are about 24% of GDP (http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2012/indexch.htm). The 2012 data for China is not 
available. 
12 We have also studied the benchmark model when Ω𝑅𝑂𝑊  is set to be 0.15 or 0.25, and the results for the 
benchmark model in this paper do no change at all.  
13 The M0-GDP ratios for the Euro area, Japan, UK and India in 2012 are respectively 9.1%, 16.8%, 16.9% and 
13.2%.  
14 In fact, only from the perspective of money supply, monetary base (M0 plus commercial banks’ reserves that 
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be explored as well. 
Category 3 parameters for the three economies are listed in Table 7 in the 
appendix. In the steady state, we can easily get that: 𝑁𝑁𝑋 = 0, and 𝑁𝑁𝑋𝑅𝑂𝑊 +
𝑁𝑁𝑋𝑈𝑆 = 0 . Given the assumption of complete steady-state asset home bias 
(𝜓𝑅𝑂𝑊 = 1), we can get that 𝑁𝑁𝑋𝑅𝑂𝑊 = 0. Then equation (54) and its analogue for 
ROW (or US) provide an equation group to solve 𝜏𝑅𝑂𝑊 and 𝜏𝑈𝑆, both of which are 
1. This implies that balanced global trade leads to equal global prices. 
 
6. IMPULSE RESPONSES AND WELFARE IMPLICATION 
 
6.1. US money supply shock and China’s economic fluctuation 
 
Now we do the impulse response analysis to see how US money supply shock will 
affect China’s macro economy through global linkages. Figure 5 depicts the reactions 
of China’s aggregate variables to a one-percent US money supply shock. On impact 
China’s inflation will increase by 0.003%, while China’s GDP will increase as well, 
by about 0.002%. Both of these increases are very small. If we look at the time series 
of US money supply, which is examined in the empirical GVAR model of this paper, 
its HP-filter cycle has a standard error of about 10%. So even when there is a positive 
one standard-error (S.E.) shock to US money supply, on impact China’s real GDP and 
inflation rate will still be slightly influenced. But one quarter later, both China’s 
inflation rate and GDP level will be pulled down, and one year later inflation gap and 
output gap are respectively about -0.007% and -0.024%.  
 
Figure 5. Impulse responses of China’s aggregate variables (cycles) to a one-percent US money 
supply shock (in percent) 
 
Generally speaking, US money supply shock has a tiny influence on China’s 
                                                                                                                                                                       
are maintained in accounts with the central bank) is the most ideal indicator for our model here. But it is not a 
money supply concept and different from either M0 or M1. From the perspective of money demand, which is 
included in the household’s utility function, monetary base is not suitable either.  
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inflation rate, but has a certain negative effect on China’s real output in the medium 
term although the immediate effect is slightly positive. A positive one S.E. shock to 
US money supply results in that China’s GDP will be 0.24% below its steady state 
level one year after the shock. These results are not that consistent with our previous 
empirical finding using a GVAR model, which is that: US money supply will lead to 
higher inflation and lower GDP level for China. The much more complex dynamic 
responses of China’s inflation and output here indicate a more complicated 
transmission mechanism. The responses here seem not to be as persistent as in the 
previous empirical model either, and three years later both the inflation gap and 
output gap diminish to zero.  
The transmission mechanism of the influence of US money supply shock on 
China’s macro economy can be imagined to be quite complicated. US money supply 
shock will first affect US macro economy, and then affect the economies of China and 
ROW through international trade and global financial market. Note that this is just a 
first-round effect. Unlike many other open-economy models which take the rest of 
world as exogenous and passive and there is usually no feedback from home country 
to the rest of the world, in our interacting multi-country model there are infinite 
rounds’ feedbacks among China, US and ROW. And the policy and transition 
functions as the solution of our cyclical DSGE model capture the accumulative effect 
of US money supply shock on China’s macroeconomic variables such as output gap 
and inflation.  
Figure 5 also shows the impulse responses of terms of trade, real exchange rate 
of Renminbi, nominal net export, real marginal cost and other variables of China to a 
one-percent US money supply shock. Figure 6 and 7 in the appendix show the 
aggregate variables’ reactions to this US money supply for US and ROW.  
To explain our empirical GVAR model result in section 3 of this paper, we 
employ the “cost-push inflation” explanation: a positive US money supply shock will 
depreciate US dollar and then oil and many other commodities’ prices denominated in 
US dollar will increase, which will cause cost-push inflation for China and pull down 
China’s GDP level as well since China adopts a dollar pegging exchange rate regime. 
Oil and other commodities can be viewed as part of the export goods of ROW, and 
their price increase can be partly represented by the increase of 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑡
𝐸 .  
Overall, for our benchmark model here the cost-push story almost holds at the 
very beginning when this US money supply shock hits the global economy. The real 
exchange rates for both Renminbi and Ro (in fact also for the nominal exchange rate 
of Ro) appreciate on impact, indicating the depreciation of US dollar. In fact, the 
export price of ROW goods will increase on impact, while the export goods’ prices of 
China and US do not change much at the beginning. The increase of the export price 
of ROW goods can be largely understood as the price increase of oil and other 
international commodities. Since ROW is the biggest economy and also the biggest 
exporter in the world, the increase of its export price (denominated by US dollar) will 
generate cost-push pressure for both China and US, given that China adopts a fixed 
exchange rate regime and US dollar is US domestic currency. This partly explains 
why both the inflation rate and real marginal cost for both China and US will increase 
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at the very beginning when this US money supply shock hits the global economy.  
Nevertheless, the cost-push story is not the full story here, because usually higher 
marginal cost generated by higher import price indicates lower GDP level, but for our 
model here China’s GDP will increase slightly at the very beginning. Thus, at least we 
can and should tell another story: the story of relative price effect. US money supply 
shock can, through the price channel, influence China’s GDP as well. Changes in 
relative prices of international trade will alter relative demands for China’s products. 
Since the export price of ROW goods will increase much, while the export goods’ 
prices of China and US do not change much at the beginning when US money supply 
shock hits the global economy, this will definitely lead to an increase of the terms of 
trade for both China and US, but lower down the terms of trade for ROW, which is 
shown by Figure 5, 6 and 7. Higher terms of trade together with the holding of LOOP 
for China imply that Chinese goods are becoming relatively cheaper in the global 
market, keeping other things equal. This kind of relative price effect will increase the 
world demand for China’s GDP, which partly explains the immediately positive 
response of China’s output gap to a positive US money supply shock. In our 
benchmark model here, this relative price effect on China’s GDP seems to overwhelm 
the cost-push effect at the very beginning, but afterwards cost-push effect seems to 
dominate. Lowered GDP in the medium run also explains disinflation of China to a 
certain degree.  
It is worth pointing out again that the transmission mechanism of the influence of 
US money supply shock on China’s macro economy can be very complicated and the 
channels identified by us above are just part of it. There are many other possible 
channels. For example, the aggregate demands of all the economies will also be 
affected by US money supply shock, and this will then affect China’s output gap as 
well. 
Intuitively, as in a standard closed economy model, an increase of US money 
supply will lead to a lower level of US nominal interest rate, which is usually called 
liquidity effect and indeed holds in our global framework here. Partly due to the 
relatively cheaper price of Chinese goods (or higher terms of trade), the nominal net 
export for China (denominated in US dollar) increases at the beginning, which then 
leads to an increase of China’s foreign asset (US bonds) holdings. Consequently, the 
money supply of China passively expands as well because of capital controls and the 
compulsory exchange settlement and sales in China. Then the nominal interest rate in 
China decreases as well due to the expansion of domestic money supply. Additionally, 
the expansion of China’s money supply also contributes to a positive inflation for 
China in the short run. The nominal net export of US will also increase at the 
beginning, partly because that the US export goods become cheaper, relative to the 
ROW export goods. Since both US and China achieve trade surplus, naturally ROW 
will have a trade deficit, which then results in fewer holdings of its foreign assets (US 
bonds). In terms of the ROW private holdings of US bonds, the appreciation of Ro 
relative to US dollar has a positive effect on it due to a wealth effect in some sense, 
but a lower interest rate of US bonds has a negative effect. The model indicates a 
positive overall effect on the ROW private holdings of US bonds (not shown in Figure 
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7). Given fewer national holding of US bonds for ROW, the central bank of ROW will 
unambiguously hold fewer US bonds. This implies a shrinking money supply of ROW 
and then a possible higher nominal interest rate for ROW. The response of ROW 
nominal interest rate could also be explained by its Taylor rule, given the responses of 
ROW output gap and inflation gap shown in Figure 7. To conclude, at early stages 
after a positive US money supply shock hits the global economy, both China and US 
will have a trade surplus while for ROW there is a trade deficit; there is a domestic 
liquidity effect in US (lower nominal interest rate) and this liquidity effect spills over 
to China, but for ROW there is an opposite effect (higher domestic interest rate); the 
holdings of US bonds for China will increase, while for ROW they will decrease. 
The above analysis mainly discusses the responses of global economy at the 
beginning periods after a positive US money supply shock hits the world economy. 
The responses of some variables in the medium term can be much more sophisticated 
than just converging to the steady state, since it is a large-scale model and different 
transmission channels are interacting with each other.  
 
6.2. The persistence of US money supply shock 
 
It is meaningful to examine the relationship between the persistence parameter of US 
money supply shock, 𝜌𝑀𝑈 , and the reactions of China’s aggregate variables. This 
relationship can be revealed by Figure 8 in the appendix. Generally speaking, the 
more persistent US money supply shock is, the larger the responses of China’s 
aggregate variables would be; while the qualitative results above remain unchanged. 
 
6.3. The share of China’s GDP in the world and US money supply shock 
 
In the benchmark setting, China’s GDP is about one half of US’ and one sixth of 
ROW’s. Will the response of China’s economy to US money supply shock be smaller 
when the share of China’s GDP in the global economy becomes larger and larger? The 
answer is no, shown by Figure 9 in the appendix.  
 When China’s GDP at the steady state is doubled or quadrupled and the levels of 
US GDP and ROW GDP at the steady state keep unchanged,
15
 a positive US money 
supply shock will result in slightly larger responses for China’s aggregate variables. 
Considering the definition of cycles in this paper, the absolute response of China’s 
economy is in fact larger than the benchmark setting. Therefore, the response of 
China’s economy to US money supply shock will not become smaller when the share 
of China’s GDP in the global economy becomes larger (even when it is double of US’ 
GDP), as long as the US dollar remains as the world currency and there is no reform 
to China’s institutional arrangements.  
 
6.4.Sensitivity analysis 
 
                                                           
15 When the world’s GDP distribution changes, some parameters (such as degree-of-openness parameters) should 
be re-calibrated according to the formula in Appendix A1. 
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In this section some sensitivity analysis will be implemented to see whether the 
results above about the response of China’s economy to US money supply shock, for 
our benchmark model, are robust or not, especially for the responses of China’s real 
output and inflation.  
 Five alternative re-calibrations are considered. For Case 1, we use M1 data rather 
than M0 to calibrate the steady-state money supply-GDP ratios. In 2012 M1-GDP 
ratio is 59.4% for China, and is 15.4% for US. For ROW we take a simple middle 
value of 37.4%. Again these ratios are amplified by 4 times in accord with a quarterly 
model.  
 In Case 2, the assumption of zero holdings of foreign assets at the steady state for 
ROW is relaxed, and thus the global trade at the steady state is unbalanced. 
Coeurdacier and Rey (2011) find that average bond home bias worldwide in 2008 is 
equal to 0.75. Earlier studies reported values for equity home bias around 0.80, such 
as in Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007). We take the value of 0.8 to re-calibrate the bond 
home bias for ROW: 𝜓𝑅𝑂𝑊 = 0.8. Since at the steady state ROW still holds 20% of 
its total bonds in the form of US bonds and there is no accumulation of foreign assets 
at the steady state, ROW households will use the interest income from holding US 
bonds to buy goods from US. Thus at the steady state in this circumstance there is a 
permanent trade deficit for ROW but a permanent trade surplus for US. In this case, 
two key relative prices at the steady state 𝜏𝑅𝑂𝑊 and 𝜏𝑈𝑆, are no longer 1, but are 
0.9999 and 0.9977 respectively. This implies that unbalanced global trade leads to 
unequal global prices. Furthermore, all parameters determined by 𝜏𝑅𝑂𝑊 and 𝜏𝑈𝑆 in 
Table 7 and log-linearized FOCs involved with foreign asset holdings for ROW 
should change accordingly.  
 Case 3 is about the steady-state nominal interest rates for US and ROW. We reset 
the annual nominal interest rate to be 1% for US at the steady state, since in 2012 the 
short-term nominal interest rate of US government bonds is near zero. In the steady 
state nominal interest rates in US and ROW should be the same, so for ROW the 
annual steady-state interest rate is reset to be 1% as well. Because there are capital 
controls for China and Chinese households are not allowed to buy US bonds, the 
steady state nominal interest rates for China can be different from that of US. 
Therefore, it remains unchanged as a 4% annual rate. It is worth being noticed that the 
change of the steady-state nominal interest rates for US and ROW will change their 
steady-state investment-GDP ratios as well. The investment-GDP ratios for US and 
ROW in Table 7 should be replaced by a new number: 27.27%.  
 Case 4 considers a smaller Frisch elasticity of labor supply, 1/3, as in Galí and 
Monacelli (2005). So the parameter 𝜂 is set to be 3. Another even bigger value 
𝜂 = 10, as in Chang et al. (2013), is examined as well, and the result (not shown in 
the paper) is nearly as the same as when 𝜂 = 3. Case 5 changes the elasticity of 
substitution between domestic and foreign goods, 𝜔, to be a rather smaller number, 
1.5, in line with Chang et al. (2013) and others.  
 Figure 10 in the appendix shows, for Case 2, 3 and 4, the responses of China’s 
aggregate variables to a positive US money supply shock. Qualitatively the results are 
the same as in the benchmark model. Quantitatively, only for Case 3 when the 
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steady-state nominal interest rates for US and ROW are set to be smaller, the overall 
response of China’s economy is slightly larger than the benchmark case.  
 Figure 11 shows the results for Case 1 and 5, which exhibit some significant 
difference. For Case 1 when M1-GDP ratio rather than M0-GDP ratio is employed, 
the amplitude of China’s response becomes much larger, compared to the benchmark. 
And the initial response of China’s output gap is negative now, rather than slightly 
positive. However, as we explained before, M0-GDP ratio is better than M1-GDP 
ratio to match the money supply-GDP ratio for our benchmark model. For Case 5 
when a smaller elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods is 
assumed, the response of China’s output gap is negative as well at the very beginning, 
rather than slightly positive in the benchmark model. This is reasonable, because a 
smaller elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods indicates a 
smaller relative price effect, and then at the very beginning when US money supply 
shock hits the global economy the cost-push effect for China’s real output is likely to 
dominate the relative price effect, not the other way around as in the benchmark 
setting. We prefer a higher elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign 
goods, rather than a smaller one, because just as stated previously such high elasticity 
can explain an observed large home bias in trade, which is also an assumption in this 
paper. 
 Generally speaking, at least the following qualitative results are robust according 
to the sensitivity analysis: when a positive US money supply shock hits the global 
economy, the nominal interest rate of China will be lowered down (the spillover of 
liquidity effect); in the medium term both China’s real output and its inflation rate are 
below the steady state levels; and both the terms of trade and nominal net export for 
China will be push up on impact, but be below the steady state levels in the medium 
term. 
 
6.5. Welfare implication of the benchmark model 
 
Now we calculate the welfare gain (or loss) of Chinese households in the benchmark 
model due to US money supply shock. First of all, we need to derive the welfare loss 
function of the representative household of China. In Chang et al. (2013), they use the 
following loss function: 
𝑊 = −
1
2
𝔼0  𝛽
𝑡
∞
𝑡=0
 𝜆𝛱 ∙  𝛱𝑡  
2
+ 𝜆𝐺𝐴𝑃 ∙  𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡  
2 + 𝜆𝑅 ∙  𝑅𝑡  
2
+ 𝜆𝐵 ∙  𝐵𝐻,𝑡
𝑈𝑆  
2
  
They argue that “the quadratic terms involving inflation, output, and the nominal 
interest rate in the loss function are standard in the optimal monetary policy literature. 
They can be derived from second-order approximations to the representative 
household’s utility function [e.g, Woodford (2003)]. The interest rate smoothing term 
appears in the policy objective in the presence of transaction frictions, such as money 
in the utility function.” And they also add a quadratic term for foreign-asset holdings 
arbitrarily, which is not strictly derivable. In fact, their argument about the quadratic 
terms involving inflation, output and the nominal interest rate is problematic as well, 
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and not applicable for our model’s welfare evaluation.  
Edge (2003) extends the utility-based welfare criterion developed by Rotemberg 
and Woodford (1997) and Woodford (2003) to a model with endogenous capital 
accumulation, just as in our benchmark model. Edge (2003) proves that: although a 
criterion can be specified such that welfare losses depend solely on quadratic 
functions (including cross-product terms) of the model’s variables (including capital 
stock and investment), an important difference from the traditional criterion is that the 
composition of output directly affects welfare in the endogenous-capital model. This 
endogenous-capital model is a closed-economy one and does not have real money 
balance in the utility function either. If we consider these two aspects which exist in 
our benchmark model, the welfare criterion would have a more complicated form and 
cannot be guaranteed to be a quadratic form.  
Therefore, in this paper we do not seek to derive a quadratic form welfare 
criterion. Instead, we use a straightforward way to evaluate the welfare losses of 
Chinese households under US money supply shock. The welfare loss function is given 
below (see Appendix A2 for the derivation): 
𝑊𝐿 = 𝔼0  𝛽
𝑡
∞
𝑡=0
 𝐶𝑡 − 𝜙1 ∙ 𝐿𝑡 + 𝜙2 ∙  𝑀𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡    
When there is a shock to US money supply, we can get the impulse response functions 
for all the cyclical components of China’s economy in the above equation: 𝐶𝑡 , 𝐿𝑡 , 
and  𝑀𝑡 −𝑃𝑡  . Since in the end all these impulse responses will converge to zero, we 
take their values in the first 40 periods (10 years) to calculate an approximated 
welfare loss as follows: 
𝑊𝐿 ≃ 𝔼0  𝛽
𝑡
40
𝑡=0
 𝐶𝑡 − 𝜙1 ∙ 𝐿𝑡 + 𝜙2 ∙  𝑀𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡    
where the utility weights 𝜙1  and 𝜙2 are calibrated to be 1.56 and 0.01 respectively,  
in order to match the equilibrium conditions at the steady state and the benchmark 
calibration of the model. 
Welfare calculation shows that: a positive 10% of US money supply shock will 
result in a positive 1.25% welfare gain (as a fraction of the steady state consumption) 
for China, a positive 0.06% welfare gain for US, but a 0.21% welfare loss for the rest 
of the world. This implies that a positive US money supply shock increases the 
welfare of US domestic households, although the welfare gain is not very big; and it 
generates a positive externality for Chinese households but a negative one for ROW. 
This positive 1.25% welfare gain for China can be decomposed into three parts: 
-0.15%, +1.08% and +0.32%, which are respectively the contributions from 
fluctuations of consumption, labor input and real money balance. Accompanied with a 
decline of China’s GDP in the medium term after the shock, the consumption level of 
Chinese households is lowered down slightly as well. But the welfare loss from this 
part is very small, only -0.15% (as a fraction of the steady state consumption). The 
major contribution of the welfare gain for China comes from the decrease of labor 
input (or leisure increase). In other words, under US money supply shock, Chinese 
households work fewer hours without consumption being much affected, and thus 
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achieve some welfare gain.  
 
6.6. Other shocks 
 
Besides the money supply shock which we are most interested in, we can examine the 
effects of other foreign real or policy shocks on China’s macro economy as well. We 
list in the appendix the figures for impulse responses of China’s aggregate variables to 
TFP shocks (Figure 12), which can be assumed to be either uncorrelated or correlated 
across economies, and to foreign fiscal and monetary policy shocks as well (Figure 
12).  
 In a typical small open economy model where the rest of world is exogenously 
given and passive, a positive foreign TFP shock normally results in a positive 
response of domestic real output. Nevertheless, in our globally interacting model, this 
does not necessarily hold. Fiscal policy shocks from US and ROW have the same 
qualitative effects on China’s aggregates, but quantitatively the effects of US fiscal 
policy shock are slightly bigger even though the GDP share of US in the world is 
much smaller than that of ROW.  
 
7. CHINA’S LIBERALIZATION REFORMS 
 
Perfect capital mobility and flexible exchange rate usually can improve market 
efficiency and improve social welfare for an open economy, especially in the context 
with no big market failures. However, these also make the economy widely exposed 
to the international shocks. After the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, some 
economist and policy makers suggest to re-examine the financial liberalizing policies 
in developing countries. In this paper we mainly explore the impact of US money 
supply shock on China’s economy, so we want to examine whether or not this kind of 
impact will be exaggerated when the Chinese economy were becoming more 
liberalized. Welfare analysis based on this may lead to constructive policy suggestions 
for China’s liberalizing reform.  
 So in this section we evaluate the dynamics of China’s economic responses to the 
same US money supply shock when some kind of liberalization of China’s economy 
has taken place. We consider three alternative liberalization reforms for China: (1) a 
partial lifting of capital controls with maintenance of the exchange rate peg, (2) 
allowing the exchange rate of Renminbi to float while keeping the capital account 
closed, and (3) the full reform which is the combination of a partial opening of capital 
controls and allowing a floating exchange rate. 
 
7.1. Opening the capital account 
 
We begin with a partial liberalization of China’s capital account while maintaining a 
fixed exchange rate for Renminbi. In this circumstance, the Chinese households are 
assumed to be allowed to hold US government bonds as an imperfect substitute for 
domestic bonds, like the households of ROW; while the households of US and ROW 
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would not buy any Chinese bonds. The benchmark-model budget constraint of the 
Chinese representative household, equation (2), is now replaced by the following: 
𝑃𝑡 ∙ 𝐶𝑡 + 𝑃𝑡 ∙ 𝐾𝑡+1 + 𝑇𝑡 + 𝑀𝑡 + 
(𝐵𝑡+1 + 𝐸𝑋𝑡 ∙ 𝐵𝐻𝑃 ,𝑡+1
𝑈𝑆 )  1 +
Ω
2
 
𝐵𝑡+1
𝐵𝑡+1 + 𝐸𝑋𝑡 ∙ 𝐵𝐻𝑃 ,𝑡+1
𝑈𝑆 −𝜓 
2
 ≤  1 − 𝛿 + 𝑟𝑡  ∙ 𝑃𝑡 ∙ 𝐾𝑡  
       +𝑊𝑡 ∙ 𝐿𝑡 +  1 + 𝑅𝑡−1 ∙ 𝐵𝑡 +  1 + 𝑅𝑡−1
𝑈𝑆  ∙ 𝐸𝑋𝑡 ∙ 𝐵𝐻𝑃 ,𝑡
𝑈𝑆 + 𝐷𝑡 + 𝑀𝑡−1 
where 𝜓 is the steady-state portfolio share of domestic bonds and is calibrated to be 
1.0 (the same as the setting for ROW), in order to indicate a zero steady-state holdings 
of US bonds for China and thus a balanced global trade at the steady state. 
Then we can get a modified UIP condition between China and US as follows: 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝑅𝑡
𝑈𝑆 + 𝔼𝑡 𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑋𝑡+1 − 𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑋𝑡 + 𝛺 ∙ 𝜓 ∙ 𝜓𝑡  
𝜓𝑡 =  1 −𝜓  𝐵𝑡+1 − 𝐸𝑋𝑡  −𝜓 ∙
𝐷𝑒𝑓.𝐺𝐷𝑃
𝐵
∙ 𝐵𝐻𝑃 ,𝑡+1
𝑈𝑆  
Since the fixed exchange rate regime is maintained as 𝐸𝑋𝑡 ≡ 𝐸𝑋, the modified UIP 
condition is reduced to: 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝑅𝑡
𝑈𝑆 −𝛺 ∙
𝐷𝑒𝑓.𝐺𝐷𝑃
𝐵
∙ 𝐵𝐻𝑃 ,𝑡+1
𝑈𝑆  
And we also have another equilibrium condition for the Chinese economy as below: 
𝐵𝐻 ,𝑡
𝑈𝑆 = 𝐵𝐻𝑃 ,𝑡
𝑈𝑆 + 𝐵𝐻𝐶𝐵 ,𝑡
𝑈𝑆  
 
Figure 14. Impulse responses of China’s aggregate variables (cycles) to a one-percent US money 
supply shock under alternative regimes for China (in percent) 
 
Figure 14 depicts the impulse responses of China’s major aggregate variables to 
US money supply shock in this circumstance. Compared to the benchmark case, the 
response of China’s economy is nearly the same. This is reasonable because of the 
strong home-bond bias and the existence of portfolio adjustment cost. By opening its 
capital accounts and allowing its households to freely hold US bonds, rather than 
letting the central bank be the only player to deal with US dollar inflows and outflows 
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and accumulate foreign exchange reserves, China will surely have more flexibility to 
some degree. However, since there is some cost for portfolio adjustment, Chinese 
households have no big incentive to deviate much from the steady-state zero holdings 
of foreign assets, especially when the interest rate differential between US and China 
is not large and the exchange rate of Renminbi is fixed.  
Nevertheless, by opening the capital account, China can achieve some flexibility 
and then some welfare gains under US money supply shock, although the welfare gain 
is quite small. Table 8 in the appendix provides the welfare gain (or loss) (as a fraction 
of the steady-state consumption) of Chinese households when a one-percent US 
money supply shock hits the global economy, under the benchmark and all alternative 
counterfactual settings. The counterfactual analysis is implanted in two ways: one is 
to reform China’s monetary institutional arrangements, which is analyzed in this 
section; and the other way is to weaken the global roles of US dollar, which is the task 
of Section 8 of this paper. Table 9 and 10 show the welfare results for US and ROW 
respectively.  
 
7.2. Floating the exchange rate of Renminbi 
 
We turn to an alternative policy reform for China when the exchange rate peg is 
removed but capital controls are maintained. Compared to the benchmark case, the 
exchange rate of Renminbi now is allowed to float freely rather than being fixed at its 
steady-state level. The monetary policy to stabilize China’s economy now is a 
Taylor-type interest rate rule as follows:
16
 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝑅 + 𝜑1 ∙ 𝛱𝑡 + 𝜑2 ∙ 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡
𝑅 
In this circumstance, the price setting for Chinese firms is no longer equivalent to PCP, 
and the LOOP condition does not hold any more. Instead, the open-economy NKPC 
with respect to the Chinese export goods’ price, which is equation (42), now applies. 
 For China, the GMM estimation of Mehrotra et al. (2011) suggests 1.34 and 0 for 
the two Taylor rule parameters. The value 1.34 indicates that monetary policy in 
China fulfils the Taylor principle, which is in line with the empirical observation that 
China’s inflation rate has been remarkably low since the mid-1990s. But the value 0 
seems to underestimate the interest rate response to the output gap for China. We set 
𝜑2 to be a little larger value, 0.15. 
 Figure 14 also gives the impulse responses of China’s inflation and output to US 
money supply shock in this counterfactual situation. Compared to the benchmark 
regime, the effect on the inflation rate is totally opposite: negative responses in the 
short run but positive responses in the medium run; the response of China’s real GDP 
is similar but the immediate effect is quite large. Since the exchange rate of Renmibi 
is flexible, on impact Renminbi appreciates (not shown in Figure 14), like the 
response of Ro. The larger positive response of real GDP on impact can be explained 
as follows: an appreciating Renminbi will attenuate the cost-push effect which will 
lower down China’s real GDP, so the overall effect would be larger given that at the 
beginning the relative price effect dominates the cost-push effect. The appreciation of 
                                                           
16 Persistence can be added into the Taylor rule, but the results remain nearly the same. 
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Renminbi has a wealth effect as well: the international goods priced by US dollar is 
now becoming relatively cheaper, so the import of China will relatively increase, 
resulting in a smaller trade surplus in the beginning compared to the benchmark 
model. The negative responses of inflation in the short run could be partly explained 
by the price stickiness and the failure of LOOP here due to a floating Renminbi: given 
the price stickiness, the LOOP gap 𝑥𝑡 ≜ 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝐸 ∙ 𝐸𝑋𝑡/𝑃𝐻,𝑡) will be negative because 
of the appreciation of Renminbi, so in the short run the inflation rate gap for the 
home-made goods price will be negative (given not very big values for marginal cost 
gap and terms of trade gap), explained by equation (41); and because nearly 70% of 
the final goods are made of home-made goods, the aggregate-price inflation is likely 
to be negative as well. 
 By floating the exchange rate of Renminbi while maintaining capital controls, 
China will have some welfare losses under US money supply shock now, rather than 
getting some welfare gains as in the benchmark model. Table 8 in the appendix shows 
that: a 10% US money supply shock will result in 0.5% welfare loss for Chinese 
households. The welfare loss mainly comes from the disutility generated by the net 
increase of labor supply, while in fact the welfare effect from consumption is slightly 
positive.  
 
7.3. Liberalizing the capital account and floating the exchange rate 
 
Finally, a full reform is considered, when both the capital account is opened and the 
exchange rate of Renminbi is allowed to float. The impulse responses of China’s 
aggregate variables are similar to the situation when only the exchange rate of 
Renminbi is floating. This is not surprising since opening the capital account has no 
big influence, as explained before. The only big difference is that the short-run 
response of nominal interest rate of China is slightly positive now, rather than 
negative. This can be illustrated straightforwardly by the Taylor interest rate rule, 
given the short-run responses of China’s output gap and inflation gap. The welfare 
result for Chinese households is still negative, but improved a little compared to the 
case with floating exchange rate of Renminbi but capital controls.  
 
8. A WEAKENED US DALLAR IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 
 
In the benchmark model, US dollar serves as the unique global currency with two key 
roles: it is the only invoicing currency in the international trade and the only foreign 
reserve currency. Due to the rise of Euro and rapid economic growth and stronger 
global influence of emerging countries such as China and India during the past 
decades, dollar standard in the international trade and international finance is being 
challenged, although US dollar is still the only currency that can be viewed as a global 
currency if we suppose there is one. 
 In this section we evaluate the dynamics of China’s economic responses to the 
same US money supply shock when some of the US dollar’s global roles have been 
weakened. Three counterfactual cases are considered: (1) there is no dollar standard in 
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the international trade and the dollar pricing is replaced by PCP, (2) US dollar is no 
longer the global reserve currency, and (3) US dollar serves as neither the only 
invoicing currency in the international trade nor the global reserve currency, and it is 
only the domestic currency for US. Would US money supply shock have smaller 
impacts on China’s economy or not, given a weakened US dollar in the world 
economy? The counterfactual analysis in this section can also help us understand 
better about what happens in reality, because the assumption of US dollar’s global 
roles in this paper deviates from the reality in some sense, and the real response of 
China’s economy to US money supply shock should lie somewhere between the 
results from the benchmark model and the following counterfactual analysis. 
 
8.1. Removing dollar pricing in international trade 
 
First we remove the dollar standard in international trade, and consider an alternative 
pricing mechanism: producer currency pricing (PCP). Under PCP the LOOP condition 
holds for all the three economies: 
𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡
𝐸 ∙ 𝐸𝑋𝑡 = 𝑃𝐻 ,𝑡  
𝑃𝑅𝑜𝑤 ,𝑡
𝐸 ∙ 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡 = 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑊,𝑡
𝑅𝑂  
𝑃𝑈𝑆 ,𝑡
𝐸 = 𝑃𝑈𝑆,𝑡
$  
In this circumstance there is another exchange rate of the ROW currency in price of 
Renminbi, 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑅𝑡 , and the non-arbitrage condition is assumed to be satisfied: 
𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑅𝑡 = 𝐸𝑋𝑡/𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡 . So for notational convenience we can still denote all the export 
prices by US dollar prices, and this will not affect the model result.  
Under PCP we also consider four alternative monetary regimes for China: the 
benchmark one when the capital accounts are closed and the exchange rate of 
Renminbi is fixed, opening the capital account only, floating the exchange rate only 
and the full liberalizing reform.  
 
Figure 15. Impulse responses of China’s aggregate variables (cycles) to a one-percent US money 
supply shock under different regimes for China when the dollar pricing in the international trade is 
replaced by PCP (in percent). 
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Figure 15 provides the impulse responses of China’s aggregate variables to the 
same US money supply shock under these four settings. Generally, we can have three 
points as follows. First of all, compared to the benchmark model result under the 
dollar pricing, the response of China’s economy with no reform or only opening the 
capital account under PCP is nearly the same, except that the initial response of the 
real GDP is negative now rather than slightly positive. Secondly, under PCP, a reform 
with a floating Renminbi but closed capital account will make China’s economy 
almost unaffected by US money supply shock. Finally, under PCP, the response of 
China’s economy with a full liberalizing reform is quite different from that with no 
reform, especially for nominal net export, terms of trade and real GDP.  
Welfare comparison shows that: under PCP the welfare of Chinese households 
will be always improved compared to the dollar pricing setting, no matter what kind 
of regime China adopts; and still the regime with no capital controls but fixed 
exchange rate is best for China, while the regime with capital controls but floating 
exchange rate is worst, under US money supply shock. Under PCP, there is welfare 
loss for US households when there is no reform for China. However, a floating 
Renminbi can always make US households achieve some welfare gains. 
 
8.2. Eliminating the role of US dollar as the global reserve currency 
 
In this part the dollar standard in the international trade is maintained and US dollar is 
still the only invoicing currency, but it is assumed that US dollar is no longer the 
global reserve currency. For this counterfactual circumstance, we consider two 
alternative settings: (1) there is a kind of international bond with zero net supply, but 
this bond is still denominated in US dollar, (2) there is a kind of international bond 
with zero net supply, and this bond is denominated in a supranational reserve currency, 
which is a combination of three currencies (US dollar, Renminbi and Ro), weighted 
by the corresponding country’s GDP share in the world.  
 
8.2.1. An international bond denominated in US dollar 
 
In this case a kind of international bond denominated in US dollar, 𝐵𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑡 , is the only 
internationally traded asset, to replace US government bond in the benchmark model. 
Its nominal interest rate is 𝑅𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑡  and its net supply is zero in every period. When there 
are capital controls for China, but not for US and ROW, both the households and the 
central bank of US or ROW can buy this kind of international bond. So the market 
clearing conditions for this international bond change to: 
𝐵𝐻 ,𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑡 + 𝐵𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑡 + 𝐵𝑈𝑆 ,𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑡 = 0 
𝐵𝑈𝑆 ,𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑡 = 𝐵𝑈𝑃 ,𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑡 + 𝐵𝑈𝐶𝐵 ,𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑡  
𝐵𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑡 = 𝐵𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑡 + 𝐵𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑡  
 The foreign asset accumulation equations for the three economies are now: 
𝐵𝐻 ,𝑡+1
𝐼𝑛𝑡 = 𝑁𝑁𝑋𝑡 + (1 + 𝑅𝑡−1
𝐼𝑛𝑡 ) ∙ 𝐵𝐻 ,𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑡  
𝐵𝑈𝑆 ,𝑡+1
𝐼𝑛𝑡 = 𝑁𝑁𝑋𝑡
𝑈𝑆 + (1 + 𝑅𝑡−1
𝐼𝑛𝑡 ) ∙ 𝐵𝑈𝑆 ,𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑡  
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𝐵𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑡+1
𝐼𝑛𝑡 = 𝑁𝑁𝑋𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 + (1 + 𝑅𝑡−1
𝐼𝑛𝑡 ) ∙ 𝐵𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑡  
These three equations together with the zero net supply condition for the international 
bond yield the following identity for the international trade: 
𝑁𝑁𝑋𝑡 + 𝑁𝑁𝑋𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 + 𝑁𝑁𝑋𝑡
𝑈𝑆 = 0 
 In this situation not only for China and ROW but also for US the expansion of 
money supply is backed by the increase of the international bond holdings. Therefore, 
the following equations hold as well: 
𝑀𝑡
𝑆 −𝑀𝑡−1
𝑆 = 𝐸𝑋𝑡 ∙  𝐵𝐻𝐶𝐵 ,𝑡+1
𝐼𝑛𝑡 − (1 + 𝑅𝑡−1
𝐼𝑛𝑡 ) ∙ 𝐵𝐻𝐶𝐵 ,𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑡   
𝑀𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑆 −𝑀𝑡−1
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑆 = 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡 ∙  𝐵𝑅𝐶𝐵 ,𝑡+1
𝐼𝑛𝑡 − (1 + 𝑅𝑡−1
𝐼𝑛𝑡 ) ∙ 𝐵𝑅𝐶𝐵 ,𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑡   
𝑀𝑡
𝑈𝑆 ,𝑆 − 𝑀𝑡−1
𝑈𝑆 ,𝑆 = 𝐵𝑈𝐶𝐵 ,𝑡+1
𝐼𝑛𝑡 − (1 + 𝑅𝑡−1
𝐼𝑛𝑡 ) ∙ 𝐵𝑈𝐶𝐵 ,𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑡  
 The nominal interest rate of the international bond is determined by the global 
financial market, and the following two modified UIP conditions link this rate with 
the nominal interest rates of US and ROW: 
𝑅𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 = 𝑅𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑡 + 𝔼𝑡 𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡+1 − 𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡 + Ω
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙ 𝜓𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙ 𝜓𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊  
𝑅𝑡
𝑈𝑆 = 𝑅𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑡 + Ω𝑈𝑆 ∙ 𝜓𝑈𝑆 ∙ 𝜓𝑡
𝑈𝑆  
where 𝜓𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊  and 𝜓𝑡
𝑈𝑆  are the households’ portfolio share of domestic bonds for 
ROW and US, and are now defined respectively as: 𝜓𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ≡ 𝐵𝑡+1
𝑅𝑂𝑊/(𝐵𝑡+1
𝑅𝑂𝑊 + 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡 ∙
𝐵𝑅𝑃 ,𝑡+1
𝐼𝑛𝑡 )  and 𝜓𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ≡ 𝐵𝑡+1
𝑈𝑆 /(𝐵𝑡+1
𝑈𝑆 + 𝐵𝑈𝑃 ,𝑡+1
𝐼𝑛𝑡 ) . 𝜓𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 and 𝜓𝑡
𝑈𝑆 are the percent 
deviations of 𝜓𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊  and 𝜓𝑡
𝑈𝑆  from their steady-state values. Here for the modified 
UIP condition linking the nominal interest rates of US bond and the international bond, 
there is no term for exchange rate, because the international bond is still denominated 
in US dollar here, which is the same for US bond.  
Under this counterfactual setting we consider four alternative monetary regimes 
for China as well: the regime when the capital accounts are closed and the exchange 
rate of Renminbi is fixed (no reform), opening the capital account only, floating the 
exchange rate only and the full liberalizing reform.  
 
Figure 16. Impulse responses of China’s aggregate variables (cycles) to a one-percent US money 
supply shock under different regimes for China when an international bond denominated in US 
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dollar replaces US bond as the global foreign exchange reserves (in percent).  
 
 Figure 16 shows the results in this circumstance. If we compare Figure 16 with 
Figure 14, we can find that they are almost the same. So if there is an international 
bond to replace US government bond, as the global reserve asset, but the international 
bond is still denominated in US dollar, the response of China’s economy to US money 
supply shock will be similar to the case as if the US bond were still the only global 
reserve asset. The welfare implication for China is also nearly the same, as shown in 
Table 8. The reason is maybe that for the benchmark setting when the US bond is the 
only global reserve asset, its net supply and other countries’ holdings of it at the 
steady state are all zero, which is close to the assumption here that the net supply of 
this international bond is zero. However, as we will see, when this international bond 
is denominated not in US dollar but in a supranational reserve currency, the result 
would be quite different.  
 
8.2.2. An international bond denominated in a supranational reserve currency 
 
In this case, to eliminate US bond’s role in the international financial market as in the 
benchmark model, still there is a kind of international bond, 𝐵𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑡 , which is the only 
internationally traded asset and has zero net supply. The difference from the above 
case is that this bond is denominated in a supranational reserve currency, which is 
created as a combination of three currencies (US dollar, Renminbi and Ro), weighted 
by the corresponding country’s GDP share in the world. Simply it can be expressed as 
below: 
𝐼𝑛𝑡 = 𝜔1 ∙ 𝑅𝑀𝐵 + 𝜔2 ∙ 𝑅𝑜 + (1 −𝜔1 −𝜔2 ) ∙ 𝑈𝑆𝐷 
where 𝐼𝑛𝑡 denotes this supranational reserve currency, and 𝑅𝑀𝐵 , 𝑈𝑆𝐷 and 𝑅𝑜 
denote respectively Renminbi, US dollar and the ROW currency, Ro. The weights, 
𝜔1  and 𝜔2, are respectively the GDP shares of China and ROW in the world at the 
steady state.  
 Therefore, the supranational currency 𝐼𝑛𝑡 now does not only have its own 
nominal interest rate, but also has its exchange rates relative to US dollar, Renminbi 
and Ro. Suppose the exchange rates of 𝐼𝑛𝑡 to Renminbi, Ro and US dollar, under the 
indirect quotation, are 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑋𝑡 , 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡  and 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑋𝑈𝑡  respectively. Then these 
three exchange rates can be in fact explained by two exchange rates of US dollar 
(under the indirect quotation as well), 𝐸𝑋𝑡  and 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡 , as below: 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑋𝑡 = 𝜔1 + 𝜔2 ∙
𝐸𝑋𝑡
𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡
+ (1 −𝜔1 −𝜔2) ∙ 𝐸𝑋𝑡  
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡 = 𝜔1 ∙
𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡
𝐸𝑋𝑡
+ 𝜔2 + (1 −𝜔1 −𝜔2) ∙ 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡  
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑋𝑈𝑡 = 𝜔1 ∙
1
𝐸𝑋𝑡
+ 𝜔2 ∙
1
𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡
+ (1 −𝜔1 −𝜔2) 
 Then if we assume the dollar pricing still exists, the foreign asset accumulation 
equations for the three economies are now: 
 𝐵𝐻 ,𝑡+1
𝐼𝑛𝑡 − (1 + 𝑅𝑡−1
𝐼𝑛𝑡 ) ∙ 𝐵𝐻 ,𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑡  ∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑋𝑡 = 𝑁𝑁𝑋𝑡 ∙ 𝐸𝑋𝑡  
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 𝐵𝑈𝑆 ,𝑡+1
𝐼𝑛𝑡 − (1 + 𝑅𝑡−1
𝐼𝑛𝑡 ) ∙ 𝐵𝑈𝑆 ,𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑡  ∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑋𝑈𝑡 = 𝑁𝑁𝑋𝑡
𝑈𝑆 
 𝐵𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑡+1
𝐼𝑛𝑡 − (1 + 𝑅𝑡−1
𝐼𝑛𝑡 ) ∙ 𝐵𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑡  ∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡 = 𝑁𝑁𝑋𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙ 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡  
These three equations together with the zero net supply condition for the international 
bond can still yield the following identity for the international trade with US dollar as 
the invoicing currency: 
𝑁𝑁𝑋𝑡 + 𝑁𝑁𝑋𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 + 𝑁𝑁𝑋𝑡
𝑈𝑆 = 0 
 The equations for money supply expansions and modified UIP conditions should 
be changed accordingly as follows: 
𝑀𝑡
𝑆 −𝑀𝑡−1
𝑆 = 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑋𝑡 ∙  𝐵𝐻𝐶𝐵 ,𝑡+1
𝐼𝑛𝑡 − (1 + 𝑅𝑡−1
𝐼𝑛𝑡 ) ∙ 𝐵𝐻𝐶𝐵 ,𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑡   
𝑀𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑆 − 𝑀𝑡−1
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,𝑆 = 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡 ∙  𝐵𝑅𝐶𝐵 ,𝑡+1
𝐼𝑛𝑡 − (1 + 𝑅𝑡−1
𝐼𝑛𝑡 ) ∙ 𝐵𝑅𝐶𝐵 ,𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑡   
𝑀𝑡
𝑈𝑆 ,𝑆 −𝑀𝑡−1
𝑈𝑆 ,𝑆 = 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑋𝑈𝑡 ∙  𝐵𝑈𝐶𝐵 ,𝑡+1
𝐼𝑛𝑡 − (1 + 𝑅𝑡−1
𝐼𝑛𝑡 ) ∙ 𝐵𝑈𝐶𝐵 ,𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑡   
𝑅𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 = 𝑅𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑡 + 𝔼𝑡 𝑙𝑛(𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡+1) − 𝑙𝑛(𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡) + Ω
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙ 𝜓𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙ 𝜓𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊  
𝑅𝑡
𝑈𝑆 = 𝑅𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑡 + 𝔼𝑡 𝑙𝑛(𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑋𝑈𝑡+1) − 𝑙𝑛(𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑋𝑈𝑡) + Ω
𝑈𝑆 ∙ 𝜓𝑈𝑆 ∙ 𝜓𝑡
𝑈𝑆  
In this circumstance the modified UIP condition linking the nominal interest rates of 
US bond and the international bond has terms for exchange rate, because the 
international bond is now denominated in the supranational currency 𝐼𝑛𝑡, rather than 
US dollar. 
 
Figure 17. Impulse responses of China’s aggregate variables (cycles) to a one-percent US money 
supply shock under different regimes for China when an international bond denominated in a 
supranational reserve currency replaces US bond as the global foreign exchange reserves (in 
percent).  
 
Under this counterfactual setting we again consider four alternative monetary 
regimes for China: the regime when the capital accounts are closed and the exchange 
rate of Renminbi is fixed (no reform), opening the capital account only, floating the 
exchange rate only and the full reform. As shown in Figure 17, except for the regime 
opening the capital account only, for all other three regimes, the response of China’s 
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economy to US money supply shock is similar to the case as if the US bond were still 
the only global reserve asset. But for the regime opening the capital account only, the 
responses of China’s aggregate variables are totally opposite to the regime with no 
reform and the magnitude becomes much larger. This kind of larger fluctuation 
generates a big welfare loss for China: a 10% US money supply shock will result in 
3.85% welfare loss for Chinese households. And in this scenario no reform is the best 
reform for China, under US money supply shock. 
 
8.3. When US dollar serves as the US domestic currency only 
 
In this part the dollar standard in the international trade is removed and replaced by 
PCP, and US dollar is no longer the global reserve currency. In other words, US dollar 
now does not serve as the world currency, but serves as the US domestic currency 
only. We focus on the situation when there is an international bond denominated in a 
supranational reserve currency. For the case when the international bond is 
denominated in US dollar, we still provide the relevant results in the appendix of this 
paper. 
Figure 18 shows the impulse responses of China’s aggregate variables to the 
same US money supply shock under four alternative regimes for China. Generally, we 
have three points to make, under this circumstance when US dollar is no longer the 
world currency. First of all, with no reform China’s economy would have similar 
response to the situation when US dollar is the world currency, and this makes the 
best welfare gain for Chinese households. Secondly, with the regime opening the 
capital account only but keeping the exchange rate of Renminbi pegging the US dollar, 
China’s economy would be much more fluctuating, and thus Chinese households 
would have quite a big welfare loss, as shown in Table 8. Third, to let the exchange 
rate of Renminbi to float, China’s economy will nearly not be influenced by US 
money supply shock at all, no matter whether capital controls are lifted or not. 
 
Figure 18. Impulse responses of China’s aggregate variables (cycles) to a one-percent US money 
supply shock under different regimes for China when the dollar pricing in international trade is 
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replaced by PCP and an international bond denominated in a supranational reserve currency 
replaces US bond as the global foreign exchange reserves (in percent). (Note: the case “Peg 
Supranational Currency” means that the capital account of China is opened but the exchange rate 
of Renminbi to this supranational reserve currency, rather than to US dollar, is fixed) 
 
 One question arises here: since US dollar now is no longer the world currency, 
why should Renminbi peg US dollar? We also examine the circumstance that the 
capital account of China is opened but Renminbi pegs the supranational reserve 
currency, rather than US dollar. The corresponding result is shown in Figure 18 as 
well. Now with the regime opening the capital account only, China’s economy would 
not fluctuate largely any more. Therefore, when US dollar serves only as the US 
domestic currency, pegging US dollar but opening capital account would generate a 
large welfare loss for China due to big economic fluctuation; but when pegging the 
supranational reserve currency rather than US dollar, China’s economy would nearly 
not be affected by US money supply shock any more. 
 
9. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this paper, we model US dollar as a world currency in a New Keynesian global 
DSGE framework within which three asymmetric economies are interacting with each 
other and the so called “rest of the world” is not exogenously or passively given; and 
focus on the effects of US money supply shock upon China’s macro economy.  
 Due to the special roles of US dollar (dollar pricing in the international trade and 
global reserve currency) and special institutional arrangements of China (nominal 
exchange rate targeting and capital controls), some negative effect of US money 
supply shock on China’s GDP can be imagined. A preliminary empirical global VAR 
(GVAR) model shows that when there is a positive shock to US money supply, China 
will have higher inflation rate and lower GDP level.  
 Our global DGSE model finds the following results: when a positive US money 
supply shock hits the global economy, the nominal interest rate of China will be 
lowered down (the spillover of liquidity effect); in the medium term both China’s real 
output and its inflation rate are below the steady state levels; and both the terms of 
trade and nominal net export for China will be push up on impact, but be below their 
steady state levels in the medium term. Several kinds of sensitivity analysis are 
implemented, and the above results are quite robust. Cost-push effect and relative 
price effect are employed to discuss the transmission mechanism.  
 Welfare calculation for the benchmark model shows that a positive 10% of US 
money supply shock will result in a positive 1.25% welfare gain (as a fraction of the 
steady state consumption) for Chinese households, a positive 0.06% welfare gain for 
US, but a 0.21% welfare loss for the rest of the world. 
 We also examine the relationship between the persistence of US money supply 
shock and its influence on China’s economy. The more persistent US money supply 
shock is, the larger the responses of China’s aggregate variables would be. It is also 
found that: the response of China’s economy to US money supply shock will not 
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become smaller when the share of China’s GDP in the global economy becomes 
larger (even when it is double of US’ GDP), as long as the US dollar remains as the 
world currency and there is no reform to China’s institutional arrangements.  
Counterfactual analyses are implemented in two ways: to reform China’s 
institutional arrangements and to weaken the global roles of US dollar. For China’s 
liberalization reform, three cases are considered: a partial lifting of capital controls 
with maintenance of the exchange rate peg, allowing the exchange rate of Renminbi 
to float while keeping the capital account closed, and the combination of allowing a 
floating exchange rate and a partial opening of capital controls. For weakening the US 
dollar’s global roles, we assume dollar pricing in international trade is replaced by 
PCP, or assume there is another international bond to replace US bond as the global 
reserve asset. This international bond can be denominated in either US dollar or a 
supranational currency, and both of these two cases are examined. Given that US 
dollar’s hegemony is not weakened, the regime with liberalized capital accounts but 
fixed exchange rate for China is best for the Chinese households under US money 
supply shock, while the regime with floating exchange rate and capital controls is the 
worst. However, this conclusion does not always hold when US dollar’s global roles 
are removed. When US dollar is no longer the global reserve currency but instead a 
supranational reserve currency replaces it, then for China the regime with liberalized 
capital accounts and exchange rate pegging US dollar now is the worst kind of reform, 
no matter whether or not the dollar standard in the international trade is maintained. 
For China, to maintain the status quo (nominal exchange rate targeting and capital 
controls) cannot always achieve the first best, but can guarantee a second best under 
US money supply shock. When US dollar serves only as the domestic currency for 
US, then for China a floating exchange rate regime or pegging the supranational 
currency can make China’s economy nearly unaffected by US money supply shock, 
no matter whether or not its capital account is opened.  
We do not intend to push our numerical results too aggressively. However, 
qualitatively our conclusions from the benchmark model and the counterfactual 
analysis can help us better understand US dollar as a world currency and the effect of 
US money supply shock on China’s economy, and then can provide some meaningful 
information for China’s policy makers. Considering only US money supply shock, a 
fully liberalizing reform with capital controls removed and the exchange rate of 
Renminbi floating is not the best reform for China. This result is different from Chang 
et al. (2013) who consider only the US interest rate shock in a small-open economy 
framework. Besides US money supply shock and US interest rate shock, many other 
external shocks and risks that are influential to China’s economy, should be 
considered as well to evaluate the potential reforms to China’s institutional 
arrangements. We leave this for future studies. 
Our framework and analysis could be extended by several means. First of all, the 
so called “sterilization activity” could be introduced by allowing the central bank of 
China to hold a certain amount of domestic bonds. Then the purchases of foreign 
assets can be financed by selling domestic bonds, which does not result in an 
expansion but instead leads to a structural reallocation of the central bank’s balance 
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sheet. Secondly, it would be a challenge to try to incorporate stochastic GDP and price 
trends into the model, so as to make it more realistic and have a chance to make best 
of data as well. We have in the model three economies, which in reality have different 
GDP growth rates and whose relative sizes are changing over time. Third, one can 
introduce the zero lower bond of nominal interest rate for US, and examine the 
spillover effects of US money supply shock when there is a liquidity trap in US. 
Fourth, a natural extension can be achieved by incorporating financial frictions into 
the model and making it more complex and realistic. Last but not least, optimal 
monetary policy making and possible policy coordination between US and China 
could be considered.  
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APPENDICES 
 
 
Appendix A: supplementary algebra 
 
Appendix A1: specification of degree-of-openness parameters for US and ROW  
 
China’s GDP can be normalized to be unit. Assume the GDP of US and ROW are 
respectively 𝑥  and 𝑦 . Then the economy of US and ROW can be viewed as 
consisting of 𝑥  and 𝑦 unit economies like China, and the global economy has 
(1 + 𝑥 + 𝑦) unit economies. Consider the situation when the prices of all kinds of 
goods are the same. Assume the import of each unit economy is 𝜌1  times its 
aggregate demand (which is equal to its GDP, since the trade is balanced here), and it 
equally comes from the rest (𝑥 + 𝑦) unit economies. So the import of any unit 
economy from another different unit economy is 𝜌1/(𝑥 + 𝑦) . Ignoring the 
intra-national trade of US and ROW, we can get the following table for each 
economy’s import components: 
 
Import from China US ROW 
China 0 𝜌1 ∙ 𝑥/(𝑥 + 𝑦) 𝜌1 ∙ 𝑦/(𝑥 + 𝑦) 
US 𝜌1 ∙ 𝑥/(𝑥 + 𝑦) 0 𝜌1 ∙ 𝑥 ∙ 𝑦/(𝑥 + 𝑦) 
ROW 𝜌1 ∙ 𝑦/(𝑥 + 𝑦) 𝜌1 ∙ 𝑥 ∙ 𝑦/(𝑥 + 𝑦) 0 
Using this table, we can calculate 𝜌2 and the parameters (𝜌1
𝑗
 and 𝜌2
𝑗
) for US and 
ROW easily: 
𝜌2 =  𝑥/(𝑥 + 𝑦) 
𝜌1
𝑈𝑆 = 𝜌1 ∙ (1 + 𝑦) (𝑥 + 𝑦) , 𝜌2
𝑈𝑆 = 1 (1 + 𝑦 ) 
𝜌1
𝑅𝑂𝑊 = 𝜌1 ∙ (1 + 𝑥) (𝑥 + 𝑦) , 𝜌2
𝑅𝑂𝑊 = 1 (1 + 𝑥 ) 
In fact, the international trade here is a simple gravity model. 
 
 
 
Appendix A2: derivation of the welfare loss function 
 
This appendix derives a second-order approximation to the China’s representative 
household’s utility when the economy remains in a neighborhood of the steady state.  
The following second-order approximation of relative deviations in terms of log 
deviations is frequently used: 
𝑍𝑡 − 𝑍
𝑍
≃ 𝑍𝑡 +
1
2
 𝑍𝑡  
2
 
where 𝑍𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑍𝑡 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑍) is the log deviation from steady state for a generic 
variable 𝑍𝑡 . The period 𝑡 utility of the China’s representative household, 𝑢𝑡 , is 
given below: 
2 
 
𝑢𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑡 −𝜙1 ∙
(𝐿𝑡)
1+𝜂
1 + 𝜂
+ 𝜙2 ∙ 𝑙𝑛(𝑀𝑡 𝑃𝑡 ) 
The Second-order Taylor expansion of 𝑢𝑡  around a steady state  𝐶, 𝐿,𝑀 ,𝑃  yields: 
𝑢𝑡 − 𝑢 ≃
𝐶𝑡 − 𝐶
𝐶
− 𝜙1
𝐿𝑡 − 𝐿
𝐿
+ 𝜙2 ∙  
𝑀𝑡 −𝑀
𝑀
−
𝑃𝑡 − 𝑃
𝑃
  
+
1
2
 −  
𝐶𝑡 − 𝐶
𝐶
 
2
+ 𝜙1 ∙  
𝐿𝑡 − 𝐿
𝐿
 
2
−𝜙2 ∙  
𝑀𝑡 −𝑀
𝑀
 
2
+ 𝜙2 ∙  
𝑃𝑡 − 𝑃
𝑃
 
2
  
In terms of log deviations,  
𝑢𝑡 − 𝑢 ≃ 𝐶𝑡 − 𝜙1 ∙ 𝐿𝑡 + 𝜙2 ∙  𝑀𝑡 −𝑃𝑡   
Then a second-order approximation to the consumer’s welfare losses can be 
written and expressed as a fraction of the steady state consumption as: 
𝑊𝐿 ≜ 𝔼0  𝛽
𝑡  
𝑢𝑡 − 𝑢
𝑢𝐶 ∙ 𝐶
 = 𝔼0  𝛽
𝑡 𝑢𝑡 − 𝑢 
∞
𝑡=0
∞
𝑡=0
 
= 𝔼0  𝛽
𝑡
∞
𝑡=0
 𝐶𝑡 − 𝜙1 ∙ 𝐿𝑡 + 𝜙2 ∙  𝑀𝑡 −𝑃𝑡    
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Appendix B: supplementary tables 
 
 
Table 5. Parameter calibration: Category 1 
China ROW US 
parameter value parameter value parameter value 
𝛼 0.5 𝛼𝑅𝑂𝑊  0.67 𝛼𝑈𝑆 0.67 
𝜃 0.75 𝜃𝑅𝑂𝑊  0.5 𝜃𝑈𝑆  0.5 
𝛿 5.0% 𝛿𝑅𝑂𝑊  2.5% 𝛿𝑈𝑆 2.5% 
𝜌1 0.3 𝜌1
𝑅𝑂𝑊  0.113 𝜌1
𝑈𝑆  0.265 
𝜌2  0.247 𝜌2
𝑅𝑂𝑊  0.344 𝜌2
𝑈𝑆  0.147 
𝜂 1 𝜂𝑅𝑂𝑊 1 𝜂𝑈𝑆 1 
𝜀 11 𝜀 11 𝜀 11 
𝜉 1.5 𝜉 1.5 𝜉 1.5 
𝜔 6 𝜔 6 𝜔 6 
𝜓𝑅𝑂𝑊  1.0 Ω𝑅𝑂𝑊  0.22   
𝜑1  1.34 𝜑1
𝑅𝑂𝑊  1.5   
𝜑2  0.15 𝜑2
𝑅𝑂𝑊  0.2   
𝐺/(𝐷𝑒𝑓 ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝑃) 20% 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊 /(𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑊 ) 20% 𝐺𝑈𝑆/(𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑈𝑆 ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑈𝑆) 20% 
𝜀𝑇  0.2 𝜀𝑇
𝑅𝑂𝑊  0.2 𝜀𝑇
𝑈𝑆  0.2 
𝜌𝑎  0.7 𝜌𝑎
𝑅𝑂𝑊  0.7 𝜌𝑎
𝑈𝑆  0.7 
𝜌𝑅  0.7 𝜌𝑅
𝑅𝑂𝑊  0.7 𝜌𝑅
𝑈𝑆  0.7 
𝜌𝐺  0.7 𝜌𝐺
𝑅𝑂𝑊  0.7 𝜌𝐺
𝑈𝑆  0.7 
    𝜌𝑀𝑈  0.7 
 
 
 
Table 6. Parameter calibration: Category 2 
China ROW US 
parameter value parameter value parameter value 
𝐷𝑒𝑓 ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝑃/𝐸𝑋 1 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑊 /𝐸𝑋𝑅 5.81 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑈𝑆 ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑈𝑆  1.91 
𝑅 0.01 𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑊  0.01 𝑅𝑈𝑆  0.01 
𝑀/(𝐷𝑒𝑓. 𝐺𝐷𝑃) 10.5%*4 𝑀𝑅𝑂𝑊 /(𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑊 ) 15%*4 𝑀𝑈𝑆/(𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑈𝑆 ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑈𝑆) 6.7%*4 
𝐵/(𝐷𝑒𝑓. 𝐺𝐷𝑃) 40%*4 𝐵𝑅𝑂𝑊 /(𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑊 ) 79.8%*4 𝐵𝑈𝑆/(𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑈𝑆 ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑈𝑆) 106.5%*4 
𝐸𝑋 6.3 𝐸𝑋𝑅 1   
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Table 7. Parameter calibration: Category 3 
China ROW US 
parameter value parameter value parameter value 
𝛽 0.99 𝛽𝑅𝑂𝑊  0.99 𝛽𝑈𝑆 0.99 
𝑟 0.06 𝑟𝑅𝑂𝑊  0.035 𝑟𝑈𝑆  0.035 
𝑁𝑁𝑋 0 𝑁𝑁𝑋𝑅𝑂𝑊  0 𝑁𝑁𝑋𝑈𝑆  0 
  𝜏𝑅𝑂𝑊  1 𝜏𝑈𝑆  1 
𝑇𝑂𝑇 1 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑊  1 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑈𝑆 1 
𝜑 0.3 𝜑𝑅𝑂𝑊  0.1131 𝜑𝑈𝑆  0.2646 
𝑃 1 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑊  0.1587 𝑃𝑈𝑆  0.1585 
𝜏7  0.2474 𝜏3  1 𝜏1 1 
  𝜏4  1 𝜏2  1 
  𝜏6  0.3436 𝜏5  0.1468 
𝑃 ∙ 𝐼/(𝐷𝑒𝑓 ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝑃) 37.88% 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙ 𝐼𝑅𝑂𝑊 /(𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑊 ) 21.43% 𝑃𝑈𝑆 ∙ 𝐼𝑈𝑆/(𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑈𝑆 ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑈𝑆) 21.43% 
𝑌 6.3 𝑌𝑅𝑂𝑊  36.603 𝑌𝑈𝑆  12.033 
𝐵𝐻
𝑈𝑆  0 𝐵𝑅𝑂𝑊
𝑈𝑆  0 𝐵𝑈𝐶𝐵
𝑈𝑆  0 
  𝐵𝑅𝐶𝐵
𝑈𝑆  0   
 
 
 
Table 8. Welfare gain (or loss) for China under alternative counterfactual settings 
 US dollar’s global roles (R1 & R2) 
Regime of 
China’s economy 
Benchmark 
(R1 + R2) 
No R1 No R2 No R1 and No R2 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 1 Case 2 
Benchmark + 0.125 + 0.146 + 0.126 + 0.125 + 0.149 + 0.147 
Capital controls 
lifted 
+ 0.126 + 0.147 + 0.145 - 0.385 + 0.180 - 0.893 
Exchange rate peg 
removed 
- 0.049 0.000 - 0.086 - 0.076 0.000 0.000 
Full reform - 0.042 + 0.026 - 0.037 - 0.022 - 0.004 - 0.003 
Notes: 1. Welfare gain (or loss) is measured as a fraction of the steady-state consumption under a one-percent US 
money supply shock; 2. All numbers are in percent; 3. R1 and R2 respectively denote the two roles of US dollar as 
the world currency, the only invoicing currency in the international trade and the only global reserve currency; 4. 
Case 1 and Case 2 denote two alternative situations that the international bond is denominated either in US dollar 
or in a supranational reserve currency.  
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Table 9. Welfare gain (or loss) for US under alternative counterfactual settings 
 US dollar’s global roles (R1 & R2) 
Regime of 
China’s economy 
Benchmark 
(R1 + R2) 
No R1 No R2 No R1 and No R2 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 1 Case 2 
Benchmark + 0.006 - 0.009 + 0.006 + 0.005 - 0.010 - 0.010 
Capital controls 
lifted 
+ 0.006 - 0.008 + 0.004 + 0.098 - 0.018 + 0.369 
Exchange rate peg 
removed 
+ 0.003 + 0.015 - 0.002 - 0.002 + 0.016 + 0.016 
Full reform + 0.000 + 0.096 - 0.003 - 0.007 + 0.001 + 0.003 
Notes: 1. Welfare gain (or loss) is measured as a fraction of the steady-state consumption under a one-percent US 
money supply shock; 2. All numbers are in percent; 3. R1 and R2 respectively denote the two roles of US dollar as 
the world currency, the only invoicing currency in the international trade and the only global reserve currency; 4. 
Case 1 and Case 2 denote two alternative situations that the international bond is denominated either in US dollar 
or in a supranational reserve currency.  
 
 
 
Table 10. Welfare gain (or loss) for ROW under alternative counterfactual settings 
 US dollar’s global roles (R1 & R2) 
Regime of 
China’s economy 
Benchmark 
(R1 + R2) 
No R1 No R2 No R1 and No R2 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 1 Case 2 
Benchmark - 0.021 - 0.017 -0.030 - 0.034 - 0.027 - 0.031 
Capital controls 
lifted 
- 0.020 - 0.017 -0.038 + 0.459 - 0.040 + 0.625 
Exchange rate peg 
removed 
- 0.035 + 0.001 -0.111 - 0.110 + 0.013 + 0.013 
Full reform - 0.041 + 0.058 -0.088 - 0.101 - 0.010 - 0.008 
Notes: 1. Welfare gain (or loss) is measured as a fraction of the steady-state consumption under a one-percent US 
money supply shock; 2. All numbers are in percent; 3. R1 and R2 respectively denote the two roles of US dollar as 
the world currency, the only invoicing currency in the international trade and the only global reserve currency; 4. 
Case 1 and Case 2 denote two alternative situations that the international bond is denominated either in US dollar 
or in a supranational reserve currency.  
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Appendix C: supplementary figures 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Impulse responses of US aggregate variables (cycles) to a one-percent US money 
supply shock (in percent). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Impulse responses of ROW aggregate variables (cycles) to a one-percent US money 
supply shock (in percent) 
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Figure 8. Impulse responses of China’s aggregate variables (cycles) to a one-percent US money 
supply shock under different settings for the persistence parameter of the shock: Benchmark 
𝜌𝑀𝑈 = 0.7, Case 1 𝜌𝑀𝑈 = 0.5, and Case 2 𝜌𝑀𝑈 = 0.9 (in percent). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Impulse responses of China’s aggregate variables (cycles) to a one-percent US money 
supply shock under different settings for the size of China’s economy in the world at the steady 
state: for Case 1 China’s real GDP is doubled, while US GDP and ROW GDP keep the same as in 
the benchmark model setting; and for Case 2 China’s real GD is quadrupled (in percent). 
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Benchmark Case 1 Case 2
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Figure 10. Sensitivity analysis A: impulse responses of China’s aggregate variables (cycles) under 
different model settings: benchmark and Case 2, 3, 4 of the sensitivity analysis (in percent). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Sensitivity analysis B: impulse responses of China’s aggregate variables (cycles) under 
different model settings: benchmark and Case 1, 5 of the sensitivity analysis (in percent).  
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Figure 12. Impulse responses of China’s aggregate variables (cycles) to a one-percent US TPF 
shock, to a one-percent ROW TPF shock, and to a one-percent US TPF shock when TFP shocks 
are correlated ( indicated by “US TFP 2” in the figure) (the correlation coefficient is 0.5 between 
US TFP shock and China’s, and is 0.7 between US’s and ROW’s) (in percent).. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Impulse responses of China’s aggregate variables (cycles) to foreign policy shocks: 
fiscal policy shock (a one-percent government spending shock) and monetary policy shock (a 
basis-point nominal interest rate shock) (in percent). 
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Figure 19. Impulse responses of China’s aggregate variables (cycles) to a one-percent US money 
supply shock under different regimes for China when dollar pricing in international trade is 
replaced by PCP and an international bond denominated in US dollar replaces US bond as the 
global foreign exchange reserves (in percent).  
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